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Taxation?: Determining the Excludability
of Employer-Provided Domestic Partner
Health Benefits Under Sections 105(b)
and 106 of the Internal Revenue Code
Lindsay Brooke King*
L Introduction
In the last decade, municipal and private employers have begun to extend
employer-provided spousal benefits to employees' domestic partners.1 IHistor-
ically, employers have provided certain benefits to employees' spouses,2 but
* The author wishes to thank Professor Gwen T. Handelman for her encouragement
and helpful insights in the preparation of this Note.
1. See Jarrett T. Barrios, Note, Growing Pains in the Workplace: Tax Consequences
of Health Plans for Domestic Partners, 47 TAx LAW. 845, 846-48 (1994) (discussing
municipal and private employers' extension of employee benefits packages to domestic
partners); Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace:
Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 Omo ST. L.J. 1067, 1072-
78 (1990) (reviewing domestic partner provisions of municipal and private employers);
Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-Traditional Family Values: Providing Quasi-Marital Rights to
Same-Sex Couples, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 317, 327-40 (1993) (discussing both
municipal and corporate domestic partnership initiatives); Jay Mathews, Gay Partners Gain
Benefits; Big Firms Quietly Agree to Pay Medical Bills, WASH. PosT, Oct. 2, 1993, at Al
(noting that "Apple Computer Inc., Microsoft Corp., Sun Microsystems Inc., Home Box
Office Inc., Warner Bros., the New York-based law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy and several other companies have agreed.., to treat partners of gay and lesbian
employees as if they were legal spouses and pay a substantial portion of their doctor and
dental bills").
2. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal
and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1164, 1194
(1992) (listing health insurance and illness, disability, and bereavement leave as examples
of benefits normally extended to employees' spouses).
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generally have denied benefit coverage to unmarried employees' domestic
partners. This employment practice undermined certain laws and policies
prohibiting discrimination in the workplace.3 Because benefits packages
comprised a large portion of employee compensation,4 employees with
domestic partners received considerably less in compensation than their
married colleagues performing identical work. Although unmarried hetero-
sexual employees, as well as gay and lesbian employees, received similarly
diminished compensation packages, heterosexual employees had the option
to marry their domestic partners, whereas gay and lesbian employees did
not.5
Employers feared that extension of benefits, particularly health bene-
fits, to cover domestic partners would result in prohibitively large costs.6
Nonetheless, certain employers gradually extended health benefits, as well
as other benefits, to domestic partners and discovered that such fears were
unfounded.! Since 1985, when Berkeley, California, became the first city
3. See Health Briefs: University Offers Domestic Partner Benefits, 22 Pens. &
Benefits Rep. (BNA) 2339, 2339 (Oct. 23, 1995) (noting that University of Denver began
extending health and other employee benefits to employees' same-sex domestic partners to
achieve consistency with university's equal employment opportunity policy); Health
Insurance: Duke University Extends Benefits to Domestic Partners of Employees, 22 Pens.
& Benefits Rep. (BNA) 250, 250 (Jan. 16, 1995) (noting that Duke University's extension
of insurance coverage and other benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees
comported with nondiscrimination policy passed by its board of trustees in 1988, which
bars discrimination against employees on basis of sexual orientation); Eblin, supra note 1,
at 1068 & nn.3-9 (listing states, cities, unions, universities, and private employers that have
implemented nondiscrimination laws and policies); Domestic Partnership Plans Pass 100
Mark, PARTNERS: MAG. FOR GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES, Spring 1992, at 11, 13 (discuss-
ing Levi-Strauss & Co.'s decision to implement domestic partner benefits and noting that
previous denial of benefits to domestic partners contravened company policy prohibiting
discrimination).
4. See Eblin, supra note 1, at 1070 & n.17 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXES AND LEvELS 1975-89, at 9 (1989))
(noting that employee benefits now average greater than 27% of total compensation in
private sector).
5. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (noting that no state currently allows
same-sex couples to marry); see also Eblin, supra note 1, at 1069 (noting that domestic
partnership status holds particular appeal for gay and lesbian couples because they do not
have option to receive benefits afforded by marriage).
6. See infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text (discussing employers' fears that
extending health benefits to domestic partners would result in increased incidences of fraud
and high cost increases in employee benefits plans).
7. See infra notes 60-61, 65-69 and accompanying text (explaining that employers'
fears of fraudulent abuse and increased costs have not materialized).
SEX AND TAXES
to extend health benefits to employees' domestic partners, several cities and
private employers have followed suit.'
One of the major advantages flowing from employer-provided health
benefits is the beneficial federal tax treatment resulting to both employers
and employees.9 Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (IRC or Code), allows the recipient employee to exclude the cost
of employer-provided health coverage from compensation subject to income
and employment tax.'" Although married employees also may exclude
employer-provided coverage for their spouses," unmarried employees may
exclude coverage for their domestic partners only if those partners qualify
as dependents of the employee.'" State law determines marital status and
may affect dependent status as well.' 3 Although several states recognize
8. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing trend of employers to extend
spousal benefits to domestic partners).
9. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing excludability of
employer-provided health benefits); see also Barrios, supra note 1, at 860-61 (discussing
employers' ability to deduct value of health benefit expenditures for employees under
Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) § 162(a) regardless of whether benefits are exclud-
able for employees under Code §§ 105 and 106).
10. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing excludability of
employer-provided health benefits under Code §§ 105(b) and 106). Employment tax -
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxation, Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) taxation, and income tax withholding - consequences tend to follow income tax
treatment. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-241, 1975-1 C.B. 316 (noting that value of employer
contributions or direct or indirect payments to, or on behalf of, employees under employer
plan making provision for employees' "sickness or accident disability or medical or
hospitalization expenses in connection with sickness or accident disability" is not includible
in definition of "wages" for FICA or FUTA tax purposes or for income tax withholding
purposes); Barrios, supra note 1, at 860 (discussing employment tax consequences of
extending health benefits to domestic partners). Detailed analysis of employment tax issues
is beyond the scope of this Note.
By contrast, employees who must purchase health coverage on their own pay tax on
all amounts, up to 7.5% of adjusted gross income, spent to provide for medical care. See
I.R.C. § 213 (1994) (allowing deduction for medical care expenses exceeding 7.5% of
adjusted gross income).
11. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing treasury regulation establish-
ing that excludability of employer-provided health benefits extends to coverage provided
to employee's spouse).
12. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (explaining that absent common-law
marriage statute, excludability of employer-provided domestic partner health benefits
depends on whether domestic partner qualifies as employee's dependent).
13. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing local law exception to
dependency status); infra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that Internal Revenue
303
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common-law marriages, no state recognizes same-sex marriages. 4 Further-
more, a person cannot qualify as a dependent of a taxpayer if that person's
relationship with the taxpayer "is in violation of local law" within the mean-
ing of IRC § 152(b)(5). I5
This Note explores the meaning of "a relationship ... in violation of
local law "16 for purposes of determining dependent status under federal
income tax law. Part II surveys the evolving employer practice of extending
health benefits to employees' domestic partners.' 7 Part III discusses the tax
treatment of employer-provided health benefits under the Code, as inter-
preted in private letter rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS
or Service).' 8 Part IV reviews how the courts and the IRS have applied to
heterosexual relationships the local law exception to the definition of depend-
ent.'9 Lastly, Part V argues that absent state enforcement of statutes prohib-
iting unmarried cohabitation, domestic partner health benefits should be ex-
cludable from an employee's gross income under Code §§ 105(b) and 106.'
Service (IRS or Service) defers to state law in determining taxpayers' marital status).
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 277 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "common-law
marriage"). A common-law marriage is a nonceremonial relationship requiring "a positive
mutual agreement, permanent and exclusive of all others, to enter into a marriage relation-
ship, cohabitation sufficient to warrant a fulfillment of necessary relationship of man and
wife, and an assumption of marital duties and obligations." Id. Currently, only 14 states
and the District of Columbia recognize common-law marriage. See Barrios, supra note 1,
at 854 n.60 (listing states that recognize common-law marriage: Alabama, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Texas, and Utah); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text (noting
that no states currently allow same-sex partners to marry); cf. San Francisco Board Backs
Gay Weddings, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1996, at A3 (discussing San Francisco Board of
Supervisors' approval of symbolic wedding ceremonies for registered same-sex domestic
partners and noting that this effort is at odds with state effort to prohibit same-sex mar-
riages).
15. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (citing Code § 152(b)(5) and
explaining local law exception to dependency status).
16. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (1994).
17. See infra notes 21-73 and accompanying text (discussing public and private
employers' domestic partnership provisions).
18. See infra notes 74-123 and accompanying text (discussing Code's treatment of
employer-provided health benefits).
19. See infra notes 124-235 and accompanying text (discussing and interpreting case
law applying local law exception to definition of dependent).
20. See infra notes 236-67 and accompanying text (arguing for excludability from
taxpayers' incomes of employer-provided domestic partner health care benefits, absent state
enforcement of laws criminalizing unmarried cohabitation).
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HI. Extension of Employee Benefits Through Domestic
Partnership Provisions21
As American families and the American work force have grown in-
creasingly diverse,22 employers have adjusted their policies in response to the
21. This Note discusses domestic partnership provisions on both the municipal and
private employer levels. On the municipal level, two different types of domestic partnership
provisions exist. One type of provision involves the municipality acting in its role as
government and provides for public registration of domestic partnerships. See Juel, supra
note 1, at 329 (citing ordinance of Ithaca, New York, as example of domestic partner
provision that provides for registration of domestic partners, but does not provide for
extension of any other benefits). The sole purpose of such registration provisions is to
provide for some official recognition and validation of domestic partnerships. See id. (noting
that only real significance of such ordinances is to provide some state recognition of relation-
ship's validity); see also id. at 319 (noting that general effect of domestic partnership
initiatives is to provide beginning of state and societal recognition of domestic partnerships).
The extent to which such initiatives will succeed in validating relationships will depend upon
whom the municipalities allow to take advantage of the registration programs. Cf. Bowman
& Cornish, supra note 2, at 1195 n. 155 (noting that West Hollywood, Ithaca, San Francisco,
and Minneapolis ordinances limit registration to partnerships in which at least one partner is
city resident or city employee, whereas Berkeley's registration program allows nonresidents,
as well as residents, to register). The second type of municipal domestic partnership
provision involves the municipality acting in its role as employer and includes the extension
of benefits to domestic partners of municipal employees through city ordinances, see id. at
1188-90 (listing examples of cities extending benefits through domestic partnership ordi-
nances, including Berkeley, West Hollywood, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Laguna
Beach, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin),
executive orders, id. at 1190 (citing New York City as example), and the collective bargain-
ing process, id. (citing Santa Cruz, San Mateo County, and Alameda County, California, and
Travis County, Texas, as examples); see also Collective Bargaining: Public Sector Bargain-
ing, 23 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 153, 153 (Jan. 15, 1996) (reporting on several unions'
agreement with Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors providing for extension of health
coverage for same-sex domestic partners).
22. See Kathy Robertson, Domestic Partnerships Raise New Questions About Benefit
Equity, 20 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 2478, 2478 (Nov. 22, 1993) (discussing diversity
of today's work force). Robertson notes:
No longer can an employer assume that a worker's support system is made up of
a stay-at-home spouse and a couple of children....
* about 4.2 million households are made up of unmarried couples, according to
U.S. Census Bureau figures;
• almost 2.6 million are unmarried heterosexuals, 1.6 million are homosexuals;
* about 8.4 million adults are living in some sort of "domestic partnership,"
according to a 1991 study by Hewitt Associates; and
° by the year 2000, unmarried individuals will constitute a majority of Califor-
nia's adult population, according to a report by Insurance Commissioner John
Garamendi (D).
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changes. Employer policies extending certain benefits to employees' domes-
tic partners developed as a response to the needs and requests of same-sex
couples.' Gay and lesbian couples have sought means through which to
provide for stability in their relationships comparable to the stability pro-
vided to heterosexual couples under state marriage laws.' Marriage triggers
a number of rights and privileges, including the extension of certain
employer-provided benefits to the spouse of an employee.' These benefits
generally are unavailable to partners of unmarried employees regardless of
the sex of the partners or the degree of commitment in the couples' relation-
23. See Juel, supra note 1, at 319 (discussing rationale underlying domestic partnership
initiatives); id. at 337-38 (describing domestic partner benefits policies of Lotus Development
Corporation and Montefiore Medical Center as responses to concerns voiced by lesbian
employees). However, domestic partnership provisions, particularly on the municipal level,
usually include unmarried heterosexual couples in addition to gay and lesbian couples. See,
e.g., Barrios, supra note 1, at 845 & nn.1-2 (discussing domestic partnership registration
program of Berkeley, California, through which Berkeley became first government employer
to extend employee health benefits to same-sex partners and unmarried heterosexual part-
ners); Eblin, supra note 1, at 1073 (noting that heterosexual couples comprise about 90% of
couples filing Affidavits of Domestic Partnership through domestic partnership provision in
Santa Cruz, California); id. at 1074 (noting that approximately 70% of applications for
domestic partner health coverage under Seattle's domestic partner provision have been for
opposite-sex partners); id. at 1076 (providing New York City's definition of domestic
partners - "two people, both of whom are eighteen years of age or older and neither of
whom is married, who have a close and committed personal relationship involving shared
responsibilities" (quoting New York City Exec. Order No. 123 § 2 (Aug. 7, 1989))); id. at
1087 (noting availability of domestic partnership as alternative to marriage for opposite-sex
couples).
24. See IRVING J. SLOAN, HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND THE LAw 34 (Irving J. Sloan
ed., Legal Almanac Series No. 85, 1987) (listing significant state and federal marital
privileges that government denies to same-sex couples as result of prohibiting same-sex
marriage); Juel, supra note 1, at 321 (listing "a host of... privileges that are automatically
available by law to married couples that are denied to similarly-situated same-sex couples").
25. See Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 417, 417-
18 (1991) (listing certain privileges granted to married couples). Berger states:
Some of the privileges available to married couples include favored immigration
status, the right of hospital, and jail visitation, reduced cost club memberships, the
ability to file joint tax returns, exemption from gift taxes, estate tax deductions,
extension of health and dental benefits, the right to sue for loss of consortium, and
wrongful death, the privilege not to testify against one another, the ability to own
property as tenants in the entirety, intestate succession, and entitlement to social
security benefits.
Id. (citations omitted); Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 783-86 (1995) (listing
several of approximately 150 "rights and benefits" granted under Hawaii law based on marital
status and noting that many of these benefits cannot be created through private contract).
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ships.2s Because no state allows same-sex partners to marry,27 gay and
lesbian employees categorically receive less compensation than do their
heterosexual colleagues.' Benefits packages comprise a substantial portion
of employee compensation,29 but courts routinely have refused to find denial
of domestic partner coverage to be a violation of equal protection or of
antidiscrimination laws and policies.' 0 Domestic partner provisions attempt
26. See Berger, supra note 25, at 418 (noting that unmarried couples, despite degree
of commitment in relationships, may not receive privileges granted to married couples).
27. See SLOAN, supra note 24, at 33 (describing states' denial of same-sex marriages).
Sloan summarizes the current status of same-sex marriage as follows:
The current status can be simply stated. From a legislative viewpoint no state
today would knowingly issue a marriage license to a homosexual couple. Further-
more, no state statute expressly affirms the right of homosexual couples to marry.
From a judicial viewpoint, the judiciary has unanimously inferred prohibitions of
same-sex marriage from silent state statutes, and all courts faced with the same-sex
marriage issue have relied on the premise that a lawful marriage, by definition,
can be entered into only by two persons of opposite sex. No court has taken the
position that state prohibition of homosexual marriage is unconstitutional.
Id.; see also Berger, supra note 25, at 418 (noting that states recognizing common-law
marriages deny common-law marriage status to same-sex couples); Brown, supra note 25,
at 794 & n.179 (noting that only four states - Indiana, Texas, Utah, and Virginia -
specifically prohibit same-sex marriage); Eblin, supra note 1, at 1068 n.10 (noting that
although few state statutes specifically prohibit same-sex marriage, courts have uniformly
construed gender-neutral marriage statutes to deny marriage to same-sex couples). Further-
more, states that statutorily prohibit sexual orientation discrimination deny marriage to
homosexual couples. Id. at 1069. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw.) (revers-
ing circuit court's dismissal of case challenging constitutionality of health department's denial
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993). On remand, the Baehr decision may give some same-sex couples a constitu-
tional right to marry. Sue N. Averill, Comment, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex
Couples Battle for Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REv. 253, 271 (1993). Such
a result is likely to pave the way for recognizing the legal marital status of same-sex couples
in other jurisdictions "because state laws generally provide that 'if you're married in one state
you're married in another.'" Id. at 271 & n.160 (citing Henry J. Reske, Gay Marriage Ban
Unconstitutional?, 79 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (1993) (quoting William Rubenstein, director of
ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project)).
28. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (explaining that unmarried heterosexual
employees with domestic partners also receive less in compensation than their married
colleagues but that heterosexual employees at least have option to marry).
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that benefits comprise large portion
of employee compensation); see also Averill, supra note 27, at 280 (noting that families rely
on employer-provided benefits that provide securities of health care, retirement, and other
financial and emotional support as part of employee's total compensation package).
30. See, e.g., Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 419-20
(Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that denial of dental benefits to same-sex partner of state
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to equalize the compensation received by employees who have domestic
partners and the compensation received by their married colleagues perform-
ing identical work."
Since Berkeley, California, extended benefits to domestic partners in
1985,32 several municipalities,33 private employers,' and one state - Ver-
employee was not unlawful discrimination because unmarried employee with same-sex
partner was not similarly situated to married employees); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel
Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that denial of health
insurance coverage to lesbian partner was not discriminatory because disparity in treatment
resulted from difference in marital status rather than from sexual orientation); Averill, supra
note 27, at 260 (discussing unpublished California case concluding that employers may
lawfully grant benefits to married partners while simultaneously denying same benefits to
unmarried partners); see also City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 520-22 (Ga.
1995) (upholding city ordinance prohibiting discrimination on basis of sexual orientation, but
denying city's authority to extend health insurance coverage to unmarried city employees'
domestic partners). The Georgia Supreme Court, in McKinney, said that the city had
exceeded its authority, under the Georgia Constitution and under Georgia's Municipal Home
Rule Act, by extending insurance coverage to people who did not qualify as employees'
"dependents," as defined by state law. Id. at 521. Further, the court explained that the
ordinance incorrectly categorized a domestic partnership as a "family relationship." Id.
31. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 2, at 1194-95 (noting that typical employee
benefits plans based upon familial relationships poorly serve many employees due to changing
constitution of American families and stating that domestic partnership provisions are one
means of remedying inequitable employee benefits distribution); Juel, supra note 1, at 319
(noting that equality rationale is "the primary motivating factor for domestic partnership
proponents simply because of the easily quantifiable inequality between same-sex and married
couples" with regard to employee benefits packages); cf. Health Insurance: NYNEX Offers
Domestic Partner Benefits to Employees Living with Same-Sex Mates, 22 Pens. & Benefits
Rep. (BNA) 2338, 2338 (Oct. 23, 1995) [hereinafter NYNEX] (noting that NYNEX Corpora-
tion limited its extension of domestic partner benefits to employees' same-sex partners
because "marriage is not an option for [same-sex couples] under the law, as it is for opposite
sex couples"); Alan W. Richardson, Sexual Orientation Rights in the Workplace: A Proposal
for Revising and Reconsidering California's Assembly Bill 101, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 425,
430 (1993) (stating that employers discriminate against gay and lesbian employees by
withholding employer-provided benefits from domestic partners); Eblin, supra note 1, at 1070
(stating that same-sex marriage prohibitions discriminate economically against same-sex
couples by categorically denying them benefits commonly extended to married couples and
noting that domestic partnership provisions, though not substitutes for marriage, reduce this
type of discrimination).
32. See Eblin, supra note 1, at 1072 (discussing Berkeley's domestic partner policy).
Berkeley adopted its domestic partner policy on December 4, 1984 and began extending
dental and medical benefits to domestic partners by mid-1985. Id. (citations omitted).
However, the city was unable to reach agreements regarding domestic partner coverage with
all of its insurance carriers until 1987. Id.
33. See LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAw 442 n. 1 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993)
[hereinafter LESBIANS, GAY MEN] (listing major cities that have adopted domestic partnership
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mont35 - have adopted similar provisions. Domestic partner provisions are
a growing trend among employers." Although these provisions differ in
many respects,37 and no single definition of "domestic partner" exists,38 the
provisions, including Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Minneapolis, and New York
City); supra note 21 (discussing domestic partnership provisions generally).
34. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 847-48 & nn.14-18 (discussing private employers'
offering of benefits packages to domestic partners); Aurora Mackey, Domestic Partner
Benefits Are Catching on... Slowly, Bus. & HEALTH, April 1994, at 73, 73 (noting that
over 70 major companies - including Lotus Development Corporation, Silicone Graphics
Inc., MCA Inc., Microsoft Inc., Viacom Inc., Apple Computer, Inc., and HBO Inc. - offer
domestic partner benefits to gay employees); see also California Bar Covers Domestic
Partners, 22 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 1669, 1669 (July 17, 1995) (noting that on
October 1, 1995, State Bar of California would become first professional association to
extend health benefits to members' heterosexual or same-sex domestic partners).
35. See Deb Price, Christmas in August for Women Seeking Benefits for Partner, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 13, 1994, at E3 (discussing Vermont's lead in extending state
health coverage to domestic partners of gay and lesbian or heterosexual state employees).
New York almost became the second state to extend health benefits to domestic partners. See
Ian Fisher, Cuomo Decides to Extend Domestic-Partner Benefits, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1994,
at B4 (noting that former Governor Cuomo announced that he would extend state health
benefits to cover domestic partners, but expressed uncertainty regarding covering unmarried
heterosexual partners).
36. See Health Briefs: Domestic Partners, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 320, 321 (Feb. 1,
1993) [hereinafter Health Briefs] (noting that five San Francisco employers added domestic
partnership coverage in 1992, as compared to only one employer in 1991, and that those
employers adding domestic partner coverage were among twenty employers considering
adding such provisions in 1992); University Extends Benefits to Same-Sex Partners of
Employees, 20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 427, 428 (Feb. 15, 1993) [hereinafter University Extends]
(noting that domestic partner coverage seems to be growing, but slow-moving, trend among
employers); see also Mackey, supra note 34, at 74 (noting that growth of domestic partner
benefits has been greatest in California and on East Coast).
37. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 2, at 1192 (noting that city ordinance require-
ments differ in language as to type of relationship that must exist between partners in terms
of duration of cohabitation and whether relationship includes sexual intercourse and noting
that, for example, Berkeley's ordinance requires that "parties intend to remain each other's
domestic partner indefinitely," and "Minneapolis requires the parties to be 'committed to each
other to the same extent as married persons are to each other'"); Juel, supra note 1, at 329
(listing important differences among city domestic partnership ordinances and noting that
"[the most important aspect in which the municipal ordinances vary is the amount of benefits
actually provided to the employee and his or her domestic partner").
38. See Health Briefs, supra note 36, at 321 (noting that "[n]o clear definition of
domestic partner has emerged.., with each organization using a number of different criteria
for defining eligibility for the benefit"); University Extends, supra note 36, at 428 (stating that
lack of standard definition for "spousal equivalent" causes confusion); Eblin, supra note 1,
at 1069 n.11 (noting differences among domestic partnership provisions in definition of
"domestic partner"). Eblin states:
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provisions also share certain characteristics.39 Each employer offering
domestic partner benefits establishes its own list of criteria to determine
eligibility for coverage.' Persons claiming domestic partner benefits and
other legal rights must first meet certain eligibility criteria.41 For example:
Almost all ordinances require that the parties live together, be eigh-
teen years or older, be mentally competent to consent to a contract, and
The definition of "domestic partner" varies widely across those programs
that recognize domestic partnership status. [Each program has its own specific
criteria.] Given its broadest definition, however, a domestic partnership would
include any two persons who reside together and who rely on each other for
financial and emotional support. Some definitions seem to presume a sexual
relationship between the partners, and hence do not allow close blood relatives
domestic partnership status. In fact, however, a sexual relationship is not a
requirement, although it may evidence emotional commitment between the
partners.
Furthermore, while "domestic partner" is the most widely-used term in
benefit programs, other descriptives include "named partner" and "significant
other."
Id.
39. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 849 (listing criteria usually required to establish
eligibility for domestic partner coverage); Juel, supra note 1, at 328 (same). Juel states:
With regard to the initiatives in place at the municipal level, commonalities
exist among the requirements and provisions of the various ordinances regarding
who may register a domestic partnership, the benefits and obligations incurred
through registration, the requirements to qualify, and how termination is handled.
Currently, all of the cities that have domestic partnership legislation in place allow
both same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples to register as domestic part-
ners. Most have registration systems whereby the two partners, at least one of
which usually must be a municipal employee, sign sworn affidavits. Domestic
partnership affidavits generally state that the two persons have lived together for
a certain period of time - usually six months to a year - and that they intend to
be each other's sole companion. In these affidavits, the parties are also usually
required to swear that they are not related by blood, that they are not currently
married to anyone, that they are both over 18 years of age, and that they "accept
responsibility for each other's welfare."
Id. (citations omitted).
40. See Alfred G. Haggerty, Benefit Cover for Domestic Partners Increases; San
Francisco Employers Boosted Programs in '92, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 21,
21-22 (listing usual criteria for establishing domestic partner benefit eligibility, including
maintaining "committed and mutually exclusive relationship, in which each partner is jointly
responsible for the other's welfare and financial obligations"; residing together with intent
to do so indefinitely; and, in case of same-sex partners, both partners exceed 18 years of age,
are unmarried, and are not related by blood).
41. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 2, at 1192-94 (discussing eligibility require-
ments to enter domestic partnerships).
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be related neither by marriage nor by blood closer than would bar mar-
riage in the state in which they are located. All ordinances require that the
partners declare that they are responsible for each other's welfare and that
they are each other's sole domestic partner.
The requirements that differ, at least in language, relate to the type
of relationship that must exist or is assumed to exist between the partners,
such as length of time cohabiting or whether sex is part of the relation-
ship.4
2
Furthermore, most cities require domestic partners to file affidavits of
domestic partnership with the city asserting that the partners live together,
are neither married nor barred from marriage by state consanguinity require-
ments, "are each other's sole domestic partner," "share the common necessi-
ties of life," and assume responsibility for each other's welfare.43 The
partners must also promise to apprise the city of a termination of the partner-
ship, for any reason, within a certain number of days by filing a statement
to such effect.' After termination of the partnership, neither partner may
enter into another domestic partnership for a specific length of time.4' Mu-
nicipal employers generally extend benefits to both same-sex and opposite-
sex employee partners.' Private employers generally employ criteria similar
to those of municipalities in extending domestic partner benefits. However,
private employers tend to limit coverage to same-sex partners of employees
in order to mitigate the inequitable effects of state marriage laws denying
same-sex couples the right to marry.47
42. Id. at 1192 (citation omitted); see also NYNEX, supra note 31, at 2338 (listing
similar criteria that private employer, NYNEX Corporation, requires in extending benefits
to employees' same-sex domestic partners).
43. See Berger, supra note 25, at 424-25 (listing typical requirements to qualify for city
domestic partnership benefits).
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id.; see also Barrios, supra note 1, at 849 (noting that typical required waiting
period is six to twelve months).
46. See Berger, supra note 25, at 425 & n.67 (listing typical eligibility requirements for
cities' domestic partnership provisions and citing purpose of Berkeley's domestic partnership
provision as attempting to "equalize benefits of domestic partners of city employees whether
unmarried by choice or because they are barred by law from marrying"); Juel, supra note 1,
at 328 (noting that all cities with domestic partnership provisions provide for registration of
same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples).
47. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 848 (noting that private employers generally have
limited domestic partner provisions to gay and lesbian couples due to equitable concerns
regarding states' restrictive marriage laws); Juel, supra note 1, at 336-38 (describing rationale
for domestic partnership policies of Lotus Development Corporation, Levi-Strauss, MCA,
and Montefiore Medical Center as response to inequity of denying benefits to same-sex
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An individual who meets the eligibility requirements of an employer's
domestic partnership program may qualify for a range of benefits.' Some
employers provide an extensive variety of spousal benefits to domestic
partners in order to help equalize compensation of married and unmarried
employees.49 Other employers extend only limited benefits to employees'
domestic partners.'
Although employer domestic partnership provisions are a growing
trend, employers have been slow to adopt these provisions for several
reasons." First, some employers worry that extending domestic partner
partners due in part to inability of gay and lesbian couples to "share in the legal benefits of
marriage"). But see Mackey, supra note 34, at 73 (citing Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc. and
Levi-Strauss as examples of private employers extending benefits to opposite-sex, as well as
same-sex, domestic partners).
48. See Berger, supra note 25, at 425-27 (discussing different benefits made available
to domestic partners by various city employers). Berger notes:
Berkeley, Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood extend health care benefits to domestic
partners of their employees. West Hollywood's health care benefits include medical,
dental, and vision insurance. Some of these same cities, along with Seattle, Takoma
Park, New York, and Madison, provide city employees with bereavement leave. If
the domestic partner or a member of the domestic partner's immediate family dies,
then the employee may leave work without penalty. Berkeley, Madison, Seattle, and
Takoma Park also provide sick leave. When the employee's partner or a member
of the partner's immediate family is ill, the employee may stay home to provide care
without penalty.
Id. (citations omitted); see also "Domestic Partner" Benefits' Extension Subject of Much
Discussion, Little Action, 18 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 948, 949 (June 3, 1991) [hereinafter Little
Action] (stating that bereavement and sick care leave are popular benefits that are extended
because they are inexpensive); Barrios, supra note 1, at 849-50 (listing variety of benefits that
employers may extend to domestic partners, including sick leave to care for domestic partner,
funeral and bereavement leave, pension plan benefits, relocation assistance, job placement
programs, employee assistance programs, and information and referral services).
49. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 2480 (listing benefits offered to domestic partners
at Apple Computer, Inc., such as access to medical plans; mental health care; prescription
drugs; vision care; employee assistance program; family, bereavement, and sick leave;
adoption assistance; child care resource and referral; access to fitness center; and relocation
assistance).
50. See Family Leave: Chapel Hill Joins Municipalities Offering Benefit to Domestic
Partners, 22 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 1163, 1163 (May 8, 1995) (discussing Chapel
Hill, North Carolina's domestic partner policy, which allows city employees to take sick
leave to care for domestic partners, but noting that town council decided not to extend
medical insurance to city employees' domestic partners "pending further research"); Minne-
apolis School Workers May Use Sick Leave to Care for Domestic Partners, 19 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) 802, 802 (May 11, 1992) (noting that Minneapolis School Board's domestic partner
policy limits extension of benefits to sick and bereavement leave).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing recent growth in employers'
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benefits will negatively affect customers' and stockholders' perceptions of
the employer. This fear is not completely irrational in view of recent public
criticism against Apple Computer, Inc. and Minnesota Communications
Group for adopting domestic partnership policies.' However, most employ-
ers have found the public's reaction to such provisions surprisingly
positive. 3 Second, some employers are reluctant to offer domestic partner-
ship benefits for fear that such provisions reward illegal relationships.'
These employers prefer not to offer benefits to employees engaged in rela-
tionships that may violate state and local laws despite the infrequency with
which government enforces such laws. 5
The most common cause of concern among employers in deciding
whether to adopt domestic partnership provisions is the fear that the exten-
sion of domestic partner benefits will increase the potential for fraud and will
result in prohibitively high cost increases in employee benefits plans. 6
extension of domestic partner benefits); see also Few Programs Exist Despite Praise for
Fairness, Business Value, 21 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 238, 238 (Jan. 17, 1993) [herein-
after Few Programs] (noting that Hewitt Associates, Chicago, estimates that only about 50
U.S. private employers offer domestic partner benefits); id. (predicting that domestic
partnership benefits ultimately will be widespread but that result will take time); Number of
Employers Offering Benefits to Domestic Partners Increases Slowly, 22 Pens. & Benefits Rep.
(BNA) 1335, 1335 (June 5, 1995) [hereinafter Number] (noting that fewer than 150 U.S.
employers currently offer domestic partner benefits); cf Few Programs, supra, at 238 (noting
that about 70% of people in 1989 survey opposed same-sex marriage, but over half favored
extension of domestic partner benefits).
52. See Minnesota Employer Announces Health Coverage for Domestic Partners, 19
Pens. Rep. (BNA) 15, 15 (Jan. 6, 1992) (discussing public outcry that followed Minnesota
Communications Group's extension of health care coverage to employees' domestic partners);
Mackey, supra note 34, at 76-77 (discussing negative reaction from Williamson County,
Texas community to Apple Computer's domestic partner policy).
53. See Approaching "Elder Boom" Requires New Benefit Programs for Employers, 20
Pens. Rep. (BNA) 954, 955 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Elder Boom] (describing reaction by
both employees and customers to Lotus Development Corporation's extension of benefits to
domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees as 85-90% favorable, although noting some
resentment among unmarried employees with opposite-sex domestic partners); Robertson,
supra note 22, at 2479 (discussing Borland International, Inc.'s surprise at lack of negative
feedback in response to company's extension of health benefits to employees' domestic
partners).
54. See Little Action, supra note 48, at 949 (noting some employers' concerns that
domestic partnership policies may violate local and state laws prohibiting cohabitation and
certain sexual activities).
55. See id. (discussing employers' reluctance to offer benefits to partners of couples in
illegal relationships).
56. See Eblin, supra note 1, at 1082-83 (discussing employers' fears that domestic
partner provisions will result in higher costs and increased potential for employee fraud, but
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Because health insurance coverage is the most expensive of employee
benefits,' employers have been particularly wary of extending health bene-
fits to domestic partners.5 8 One of the main reasons that employers cite for
refusing to adopt domestic partnership policies is a fear that employees will
take advantage of the policies by attempting to register mere friends in need
of health care coverage who cannot afford the coverage themselves.59
However, proponents of domestic partner provisions note that the experience
of both municipal and private employers with these provisions has revealed
no evidence of fraudulent abuse.' This absence of fraudulent registration
is primarily attributable to built-in precautions in employer policies, such as
the usual requirement that a couple registering for domestic partner benefits
sign affidavits of domestic partnership, which subjects the employee to legal
consequences if third parties suffer losses as a result of an employee's
fraudulent misrepresentation of status.61
noting that these fears have proven to be irrational). But see Juel, supra note 1, at 339-40
(noting inequity of employers' assumptions that gay and lesbian employees have greater
tendency than heterosexual employees to lie about nature of their relationships). Juel states:
[P]roponents ... point out that employers rarely require a heterosexual employee to
prove that he or she is indeed married to the person he or she seeks to enroll in the
employer's health insurance plan for spousal coverage. It would therefore be unfair for
employers to adopt an unwarranted presumption that partners to a same-sex couple are
more likely to lie about the nature of their relationship than are heterosexual couples.
Id.
57. See Little Action, sapra note 48, at 948 (stating that average annual cost of health
insurance per employee is $3000).
58. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 849 ("Health benefits are the most costly to an
employer, and thus are one of the most serious considerations a company makes with regard
to its employee benefits policy."); id. at 849 n.28 (noting that cost was major factor for Lotus
Development Corporation, which became first Fortune 500 company to extend health benefits
to domestic partners); Juel, supra note 1, at 320 (stating that employers are attempting to
decrease extension of health care coverage to employees and their families because of
dramatically increasing cost of health insurance); id. at 330 (noting that, in extending benefits
to domestic partners of city employees, Berkeley and West Hollywood expressed greatest
concern over cost of health insurance benefits because costs of offering sick and bereavement
leave are negligible).
59. See Juel, supra note 1, at 339 (discussing employers' fear that domestic partner
health insurance coverage will increase fraudulent registration and, consequently, will raise
cost of health coverage for all employees).
60. See id. (noting lack of any evidence of fraudulent registration in municipalities and
private companies that already have domestic partnership provisions and citing Village Voice
newspaper as specific example of employer that has had domestic partnership policy in place
for 10 years but has not experienced any fraudulent registration problems).
61. See Berger, supra note 25, at 432-33 (discussing requirements of employers'
SEX AND TAXES
A potential increase in Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-
related health care costs due to a greater number of high-risk eligible benefi-
ciaries also increases employers' skepticism about their ability to provide
domestic partner coverage.62 Insurers initially feared this potential for
increase in AIDS cases as well and, as a result, either refused to provide
coverage for domestic partners or increased the cost of policies for employ-
ers with domestic partner provisions in place.63 Because of this reluctance,
most employers offering domestic partner health coverage, until recently,
have been self-insured.' Concerns of employers and insurers about cost
increases due to AIDS coverage, however, have not been realized for several
reasons. First, the number of gay and lesbian employees enrolling for
domestic partner benefits has been considerably lower than anticipated.65
domestic partnership provisions that render fraudulent registration unlikely); Eblin, supra
note 1, at 1083 (listing typical requirements to qualify as domestic partners - including
sharing residence for certain duration, financial dependence, and professed emotional
commitment excluding all others - that make fraudulent registration unlikely); Juel, supra
note 1, at 339 (discussing lack of fraudulent registration in experience of employers having
domestic partnership provisions).
62. See Berger, supra note 25, at 420 n.24 (citing Kathy Bodovitz, Domestic Partner
Debate May Key on Economics, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1989, at A4, for proposition that
opponents of San Francisco's extension of health benefits to domestic partners fear compro-
mise of city's ability to provide health care benefits due to increase of eligible beneficiaries
with high risk of contracting AIDS); Few Programs, supra note 51, at 238 (noting that high
costs of AIDS treatment is concern among employers considering domestic partner benefits);
Eblin, supra note 1, at 1082 (stating that employers and insurers fear that gay employees will
enroll large numbers of domestic partners who have AIDS).
63. See Juel, supra note 1, at 331 (citing West Hollywood as example of employer that
could not find commercial medical insurance carrier to cover employees' domestic partners
and noting that city, therefore, had to create its own insurance company to cover domestic
partners); id. at 330-31 (noting that Berkeley's insurance carrier levied 1.5% surcharge to
cover anticipated increases in claims); Mackey, supra note 34, at 76 (noting caution with
which insurers moved in providing domestic partner coverage - first levying surcharges to
cover additional claims and dropping them only after experience proved them to be unneces-
sary).
64. See Jack B. Helitzer, Health Care Coverage for Domestic Partners, 6 BENEFrrS L.J.
245, 250-51 (1993) (noting that employers who extend domestic partner coverage must self-
insure as practical matter); Kaiser to Offer Health Insurance to Firms with More Than 100
Employees, 21 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 672, 672 (Mar. 28, 1994) (noting that firms
offering domestic partner health coverage, until recently, had to self-insure and listing firms
now offering health coverage to domestic partners through fully insured plans).
65. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 850-51 (noting that enrollment of gay and lesbian
employees in domestic partnership employer health plans typically is between 0% and 2.5%
of total work force); Eblin, supra note 1, at 1082 (noting that more heterosexual employees-
than gay and lesbian employees take advantage of domestic partner provisions); id. at 1072-73
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Furthermore, the incidence of AIDS is less likely among lesbians than
among any other segment of the population.' Most importantly, however,
the cost of AIDS treatment for an individual is typically less than the cost of
covering other, more common health conditions, such as premature or
multiple births,67 complications due to smoking or overeating, and cardiovas-
cular problems.68 Therefore, domestic partners have posed no greater insur-
ance risk than have heterosexual couples.69
Several municipal and private employers now extend health benefits to
domestic partners." As experience with domestic partner programs has
(showing that same-sex partner enrollment is only 15 % of total domestic partner enrollment
in Berkeley and only 10% of total enrollment in Santa Cruz). In fact, overall enrollment for
domestic partner benefits has been surprisingly low among municipal and private employers
enacting these provisions. See Mackey, supra note 34, at 74-75 (citing results of 1993 survey
by Segal Company, a New York employee benefits company). Less than 5 % of employees
in companies with domestic partnership provisions register for these benefits. Id. It is not
unusual for this rate to be below 2%. Id.; see also Juel, supra note 1, at 334-35 (discussing
reasons for low employee enrollment). Many domestic partners already receive coverage
under their own employers' health plans. Juel, supra note 1, at 335. Some same-sex couples
may not want their relationship to become public knowledge and, therefore, do not register
for domestic partner benefits. Id.
66. See Berger, supra note 25, at 433-34 (allaying opponents' fears that same-sex
partner health coverage will result in prohibitively increased insurance costs).
67. See Elder Boom, supra note 53, at 955 (noting that average cost of AIDS case is
between $50,000 and $150,000 - less than average cost of premature or multiple birth case).
68. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 2479 (stating that employers should concern
themselves more with costs of covering smokers, overeaters, and people with cardiovascular
problems than with cost of covering people at high risk for AIDS).
69. See Number, supra note 51, at 1335 (noting that costs of covering domestic partners
has been lower than anticipated because increased risk of AIDS associated with same-sex
male couples is offset by lower risk of same-sex female couples and because same-sex couples
have near-zero risk of pregnancy); Robertson, supra note 22, at 2480 (stating that domestic
partners appear, from claims experience statistics, healthier than population as whole and that
costs increase when employers cover heterosexual domestic partners in addition to same-sex
partners); Juel, supra note 1, at 331 (noting that Berkeley has found that costs of insuring
domestic partners and employees' spouses and dependents are equivalent); id. at 332 (stating
that West Hollywood's city health plan has actually received benefit from covering domestic
partners due to additional premium payments generated); Mackey, supra note 34, at 74
(noting that experience of Levi-Strauss indicates that insurance costs may even be less for gay
and lesbian couples than for heterosexual couples).
70. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 847 n.13 (listing U.S. jurisdictions that extend health
benefits to employees' domestic partners); Eblin, supra note 1, at 1072-75, 1077 (citing
Berkeley, West Hollywood, Santa Cruz, Seattle, and Laguna Beach as municipalities that
extend health care benefits to domestic partners); Juel, supra note 1, at 337-39 (citing Lotus
Development Company, Montefiore Medical Center, Village Voice newspaper, and Ben and
Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream Company as examples of private employers who extend health
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allayed employers' initial concerns about prohibitive costs, insurance cover-
age for domestic partners has become easier to obtain.7 More employers
are likely to institute similar benefits policies in order to remain competitive
in attracting and retaining the most qualified work force. 2 The extension of
these benefits may not equalize the treatment of married employees and
unmarried employees who have domestic partners, however, due to the
unequal tax consequences resulting from domestic partners' receipt of
employer-provided health benefits. 3
benefits to employees' domestic partners).
71. See Mackey, supra note 34, at77 ("[A]ttitudes have changed dramatically in the last
three years, and... companies instituting domestic partner benefits today would likely have
a much easier time of it. 'Three years ago, insurers were nervous. There were a lot of
assumptions made about what the costs would be. That's now been demystified.'"); id. at 74
(listing states - including California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and Wisconsin -
that have paved way for domestic partner benefits by removing insurance barriers to domestic
partner coverage). But see generally Public Employees: State Insurance Commissioner
Rejects Health Insurance for Domestic Partners, 22 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 2601 (Nov.
27, 1995) (reporting on Georgia Insurance Commissioner John Oxendine's denial of requests
by four insurance companies to offer health insurance coverage to unmarried domestic
partners). Oxendine said:
To allow unmarried adult couples to have the financial health insurance
benefits of being a married couple conflicts with the intent of the Georgia Legisla-
ture, is in direct opposition to the public policy of this state, and also runs contrary
to the moral and ethical fiber of the state. It is something that I will not do.
Id. at 2601. This decision "does not apply," however, "to self-insured employers." Id.; see
also Emory Offers Domestic Partner Benefits, 22 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 1908, 1908
(Aug. 21, 1995) (discussing Emory University's extension of health and dental care coverage
to employees' same-sex domestic partners through its self-funded plans).
72. See Corporate Governance: Group Urges Principles to Assure Workplace Fairness,
22 Pens. & Benefits Rep. (BNA) 1206, 1207 (May 15, 1995) ("Companies and industries that
are most interested in adopting non-discrimination policies and implementing them to their
fullest, including domestic partner health benefits, 'tend to be [industries] where there's high
competition for skilled workers because it just makes sense.'" (quoting Diane Bratcher,
cochairwoman of the Wall Street Project of the Community Lesbian and Gay Rights Institute
in New York)); Mackey, supra note 34, at 73 (noting that some companies extend domestic
partner benefits in order to attract and retain employees by offering best possible benefits
packages); cf. Juel, supra note 1, at 332 (noting that one of main benefits of West Holly-
wood's domestic partnership program has been increase in employee morale).
73. Although these unequal tax consequences are the focus of this Note, domestic
partners fail to achieve parity with married couples in other respects as well. See generally
William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1995) (arguing that domestic partnership provisions do not create true
equality between domestic partners and married couples due to unequal tax consequences, as
well as to burden of proof problems encountered by domestic partners that married couples
do not similarly encounter).
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IM. Tax Treatment of Employer-Provided Health Benefits
IRC § 61 defines gross income as "all income from whatever source
derived."74 Code § 61(a)(1) specifically includes in gross income "[c]ompen-
sation for services, including... fringe benefits. "75 Generally, any economic
benefit received under an arrangement between an employer and an employee
constitutes compensation for services, and the employee must include in gross
income the value of the benefit received. 76 Further, subparagraph (a)(4)(i) of
Treasury Regulation § 1.61-21 establishes that fringe benefits are includible
in the income of the person who performed the services on account of which
the employer provided the fringe benefit, regardless of who actually received
the benefit.' Therefore, health benefits provided by an employer to an
employee's domestic partner would be includible in the gross income of the
employee on account of whose services the employer provides the benefits.
However, Treasury Regulation § 1.61-21(a)(2) provides that fringe benefits
are excludable from gross income to the extent that they comply with require-
ments of other Code provisions specifically excluding the benefits.78
Certain employer-provided health benefits are excludable from an em-
ployee's gross income under the Code. Specifically, IRC § 106 excludes the
value of employer-provided coverage under an accident or health plan.79 That
is, neither employer premium payments nor the value of the health insurance
covering an employee is includible as income. Treasury Regulation § 1.106-1
clarifies that the exclusion extends to coverage for an employee's spouse and
"dependents," as defined in § 152 .' Further, payments under self-funded
74. I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
75. Id. § 61(a)(1).
76. See id. § 102(c)(1) (noting that general provision excluding from income property
received by gift "shall not exclude from gross income any amount transferred by or for an
employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee"); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S.
278, 287-89 (1960) (suggesting that only exceptional case of payment by employer to
employee amounts to gift and that strong presumption exists that such payment is payment
for services and is, therefore, taxable).
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a)(4)(i) (as amended in 1992) ("A taxable fringe benefit
is included in the income of the person performing the services in connection with which the
fringe benefit is furnished. Thus, a fringe benefit may be taxable to a person even though that
person did not actually receive the fringe benefit.").
78. See id. § 1.61-21(a)(2) (providing for specific exclusion from gross income of
certain fringe benefits).
79. See I.R.C. § 106 (1994) (excluding value of employer-provided coverage under
accident or health plan).
80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (as amended in 1963) ("The gross income of an em-
ployee does not include contributions which his employer makes to an accident or health plan
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employer plans also are excludable under Code § 105(b). 8 This section
excludes payments from employers or employer plans to reimburse expenses
for "medical care '82 of the employee, spouse, and dependents.'
In the absence of a state common-law marriage statute, domestic partners
cannot qualify as spouses under the Code.' Whether the IRS will allow
taxpayers to exclude employer-provided health coverage for a domestic
partner not qualifying as a taxpayer's spouse, therefore, depends upon
whether the domestic partner comes within the definition of "dependent"
under Code § 152 .' Section 152 defines dependents of a taxpayer as persons
for compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to the employee for personal injuries or
sickness incurred by him, his spouse, or his dependents, as defined in section 152.").
81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-11(a) (1981) ("Under section 105(a), amounts received by
an employee through a self-insured medical reimbursement plan which are attributable to
contributions of the employer, or are paid by the employer, are included in the employee's
gross income unless such amounts are excludable under section 105(b)."); id. § 1.105-
1 l(b)(1)(i) (defining "self-insured medical reimbursement plan" for Code § 105(b) purposes
as plan or arrangement under which reimbursement is not "provided under an individual or
group policy of accident or health insurance issued by a licensed insurance company or under
an arrangement in the nature of a prepaid health care plan that is regulated under federal or
state law in a manner similar to the regulation of insurance companies").
82. See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (1994) (defining "medical care"). The Code states:
The term "medical care" means amounts paid - (A) for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body, (B) for transportation primarily for and essential
to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A), or (C) for insurance (including
amounts paid as premiums under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
relating to supplementary medical insurance for the aged) covering medical care
referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (as amended in 1975) (noting that Code § 105(b) exclu-
sion does not apply to wages received under wage continuation program although taxpayer
may have incurred medical expenses during period of absence).
83. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (1994). This section provides:
[G]ross income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) if such
amounts are paid, directly or indirectly, to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer
for expenses incurred by him for the medical care (as defined in section 213(d))
of the taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents (as defined in section 152).
Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (as amended in 1975) ("[P]ayment to or on behalf of the
taxpayer's spouse or dependents shall constitute indirect payment to the taxpayer.").
84. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing deference to states in determin-
ing individual's marital status for purposes of administering federal tax laws); see also supra
note 27 and accompanying text (noting that same-sex domestic partner can never qualify as
employee's spouse due to denial of same-sex marriages by all states).
85. See I.R.C. § 152 (1994) (defining "dependent"); see also Barrios, supra note 1, at
848 (discussing federal tax treatment of employer-provided health benefits).
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who receive over half of their support for the taxable year from the taxpayer
and who come within one of the nine enumerated categories in the Code
section.' A domestic partner would appear to fit into the category described
in § 152(a)(9): "An individual ... who, for the taxable year of the taxpayer,
has as his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and is a member
of the taxpayer's household."' The regulations clarify that the individual
must be a member of the taxpayer's household for the entire taxable year.'
An individual who qualifies as an employee's domestic partner under most
employers' domestic partner provisions and for whom the taxpayer provides
the requisite support would appear to qualify as a dependent - at least after
the first full taxable year that the couple shares a household. However,
Code § 152(b) provides further qualifications to the general definition of
dependent.8 9 Specifically, subparagraph (5) excludes an individual from the
definition of dependent "if at any time during the taxable year of the tax-
payer the relationship between such individual and the taxpayer is in viola-
tion of local law. "'
86. See I.R.C. § 152(a) (1994) (providing general definition of dependent). The Code
states:
(a) General definition. - For purposes of this subtitle, the term "dependent"
means any of the following individuals over half of whose support, for the calen-
dar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the
taxpayer... :
(1) A son or daughter of the taxpayer, or a descendant of either,
(2) A stepson or stepdaughter of the taxpayer,
(3) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer,
(4) The father or mother of the taxpayer, or an ancestor of either,
(5) A stepfather or stepmother of the taxpayer,
(6) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the taxpayer,
(7) A brother or sister of the father or mother of the taxpayer,
(8) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law,
or sister-in-law of the taxpayer, or
(9) An individual [other than the taxpayer's spouse] who, for the taxable year of
the taxpayer, has as his principal place of abode the home of the taxpayer and is
a member of the taxpayer's household.
Id.
87. Id. § 152(a)(9).
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (as amended in 1971) (clarifying that person, other
than spouse of taxpayer, must be member of taxpayer's household for entire taxable year to
qualify as dependent under Code § 152(a)(9)).
89. See I.R.C. § 152(b) (1994) (providing special rules relating to definition of "de-
pendent").
90. Id. § 152(b)(5).
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Health benefits are the only domestic partner benefits on which the
Service has expressed an opinion to date. The IRS has addressed tax treat-
ment of domestic partner health benefits on four separate occasions in the
form of private letter rulings.91 Although the IRS asserts that these letter
rulings have no precedential value, the rulings provide insight into how the
Service is likely to respond to future taxpayer exclusion claims for these
benefits.92 Three of these rulings responded to city and county officials'
requests for the IRS to analyze the tax consequences of extending health
benefits to municipal employees' domestic partners. 3 The most recent
ruling responded to an international law firm's similar request.'
The Service first addressed the excludability of health benefits- covering
domestic partners in Private Letter Ruling 90-34-048. 95 This ruling re-
sponded to the city of Seattle's request for an analysis of the excludability of
city-provided health care benefits to employees and their domestic partners
under Code §§ 105 and 106. The Service began with the observation that
such benefits provided to persons other than the employee, or the employee's
spouse or dependents, would not qualify for exclusion from the employee's
91. See generally Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19, 1996) (discussing tax treatment
of employer-provided domestic partner health benefits); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31,
1992) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Mar. 1, 1991) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048
(Aug. 24, 1990) (same).
92. See I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1994) (providing that written determinations have no
precedential value unless otherwise established by regulations); Barrios, supra note 1, at 851
(noting that Service is likely to follow analysis from private letter rulings in deciding future
cases). But see Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 n. 17 (1981) (citing private
letter rulings as evidence of Service's inconsistent analysis); Hanover Bank v. Commissioner,
369 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1962) (noting that private letter rulings reveal Service's interpretation
of Code and serve as evidence that particular interpretation is allowable under Code).
93. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992) (concerning extension of city's health
fund to domestic partners of city employees whereby established trust reimbursed mandatory
payroll deductions for employee contributions to health fund); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060
(Mar. 1, 1991) (concerning county's self-insured medical reimbursement plan funded through
employer and employee contributions that allowed election by eligible employees to cover
domestic partners); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (responding to request
concerning application of certain Code sections, including §§ 105 and 106, to city's extension
of health care benefits to domestic partners).
94. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19, 1996) (concerning international law firm's
amendment to its health care plan funded with after-tax employee and firm contributions that
would allow qualified employees to elect to cover domestic partners).
95. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990).
96. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 851 n.41 (noting general public's awareness that
Private Letter Ruling responded to request from Seattle, although released version of ruling
did not refer to taxpayer involved by name).
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gross income.97 The ruling further stated that a domestic partner covered
by the city's health plan could not qualify as an employee's spouse because
the state in question did not recognize common-law marriages, 9 noting that
an individual's marital status as determined under state law governs an
individual's marital status for purposes of administering the federal tax
laws. 99
The ruling also discussed the requirements for qualifying as an em-
ployee's dependent for purposes of Code §§ 105 and 106. According to the
ruling, the Service would consider the totality of the facts and circum-
stances of each individual case in determining whether an employee's
domestic partner qualifies as a dependent under Code § 152(a)(9)."° The
domestic partner must meet the support requirement and qualify as a
member of the taxpayer's household under Code § 152(a)(9), taking into
account the requirement of Code § 152(b)(5) that the domestic partner's
relationship with the taxpayer at no time during the taxable year violate
local law.'0 ' Although the letter ruling did not provide examples of local
laws that may disqualify a person for dependent status, the IRS did indicate
that the local law exception refers to "laws of the state of residence govern-
ing the legality of interpersonal relationships. ,1(u
For those domestic partners who could not qualify as either a common-
law spouse or a dependent of the taxpayer, the Service proceeded to ana-
lyze the specific tax consequences to the employee taxpayer. 3 A taxpayer
who received employer-provided health coverage for a domestic partner
would have to include in gross income, as compensation for services, the
97. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (concluding that health benefits
provided to persons other than employee or employee's spouse or dependents are not
excludable under Code §§ 105(b) or 106).
98. See id. (concluding that heterosexual domestic partner cannot qualify as employee's
spouse in absence of state common-law marriage statute).
99. See Von Tersch v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) (establishing that state
law governs marital status fbr federal tax purposes); Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (same).
100. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (announcing totality-of-facts-and-
circumstances test for determining whether domestic partner qualifies as employee's depend-
ent).
101. See id. (explaining that totality-of-facts-and-circumstances test for dependency
requires that individual meet support requirement and member-of-household requirement
under Code § 152(a)(9), as well as local law requirement under Code § 152(b)(5)).
102. Id.
103. See id. (discussing tax consequences to employee taxpayer for employer health




fair market value of such coverage, determined by the amount that the
covered individual would have to pay for such coverage at individual policy
rates in an arms-length transaction."M The Service further explained that
to the extent that the taxpayer included domestic partner coverage in gross
income, the taxpayer need not include amounts reimbursed through such
coverage for personal injury or illness. 5 Finally, the ruling indicated that
the amount of such coverage included in an employee's gross income also
constitutes "wages" for purposes of employment taxes, which the employer
must report in the same manner that it reports other wages that it pays to
the employee.
0 6
The Service provided a similar analysis and reached the same conclu-
sions, except as to valuation, in the next two private letter rulings concern-
ing the extension of employer-provided health care benefits to domestic
partners. 7 In Private Letter Ruling 91-09-060,"' the Service revised its
position by allowing an employee whose domestic partner receives health
coverage under group medical coverage to include in gross income the fair
market value of the group medical coverage, notwithstanding the possibility
that the value may be less than the amount that the domestic partner would
pay for individual coverage in an arms-length transaction.)19 Private Letter
104. See id. (concluding that employees must include in gross income fair market value,
determined by amount domestic partner would pay at individual policy rates in market, of
employer-provided health coverage provided to domestic partner).
105. See id. (citing Code § 104(a)(3) for proposition that employee may exclude from
gross income payments received through insurance treated as purchased by employee, with
value thereof includible in gross income); see also I.R.C. § 104(a)(3) (1994) (excluding
insurance payments for personal injuries or sickness). Code § 104(a)(3) states:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deduc-
tions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior
taxable year, gross income does not include . . . amounts received through
accident or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness (other than amounts
received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to
contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of
the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer).
Id.
106. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (noting that amounts includible in
employee's gross income constitute "wages" for employment tax purposes).
107. See generaly Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-026 (July 31, 1992) (concluding that employer-
provided domestic partner health benefits are includible in employee's gross income absent
domestic partner's qualification as employee's dependent); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Mar.
1, 1991) (same).
108. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Mar. 11, 1991).
109. Compare id. (allowing employee to include in income fair market value of group
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Ruling 91-09-060 also provided a more thorough description of income and
employment tax consequences of domestic partner coverage. Specifically,
the ruling explained that employers must withhold a percentage of wages,
including wages received on account of domestic partner coverage, for
income taxation and for Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
taxation. 1 0 However, the ruling explains that a municipal employer need
not pay federal unemployment tax on account of the amounts paid to cover
domestic partners. 11
In Private Letter Ruling 92-31-062 "2 and Private Letter Ruling 96-03-
011,113 the Service's most recent responses to the domestic partner health
coverage issue, the Service reached the same conclusions as to includibility
and value as it did in Private Letter Ruling 91-09-060." 4 Additionally, in
Private Letter Ruling 92-31-062, the Service suggested that the case-by-
case analysis by which one determines whether a domestic partner qualifies
as a dependent under Code § 152 should take account of "local law[s] that
affirmatively recognize[] unmarried cohabitation.""15 This language ap-
pears to account for domestic partner legislation of the type already in place
in several municipalities and in Vermont.16 However, the language of the
ruling does not clarify whether the IRS must look solely to states for such
legislation or whether affirmative recognition of unmarried cohabitation on
medical coverage provided to domestic partner) with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24,
1990) (providing that employee must include in gross income fair market value of domestic
partner coverage, determined according to how much covered domestic partner would have
to pay at individual policy rates, regardless of cost to employer).
110. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Mar. 1, 1991) (concluding that amounts includible
in employee's gross income for domestic partner coverage constitute "wages" under Code
§ 3401(a) and, therefore, constitute "wages" for withholding purposes under Code § 3402 and
FICA taxation under Code § 3121(a)).
111. See id. (noting that amounts included in employees' incomes on account of domestic
partner coverage are not subject to FUTA taxes under Code § 3306(c)(7)); Barrios, supra
note 1, at 853 (explaining that FUTA imposes excise tax on all employers based on total
wages but that tax is not applicable to employees of states or their political subdivisions).
Therefore, state and municipal employers need not withhold additional amounts under this
tax provision on account of employer-provided domestic partner coverage. Id.
112. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992).
113. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19, 1996).
114. See id. (determining that fair market value of group medical coverage extended to
domestic partner is includible in employee's gross income if domestic partner does not qualify
as employee's spouse or dependent); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992) (same).
115. Priv. Itr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992).
116. See supra notes 32-33, 35 and accompanying text (listing jurisdictions that have
domestic partner provisions in place).
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the municipal level may satisfy the local law requirement as well. Further,
the Service did not explain how the local law determination would be made
in jurisdictions in which local domestic partnership laws appear to conflict
with state sodomy or lewd and lascivious cohabitation laws. One implica-
tion is that the Service does not regard such state laws as conflicting with
municipal domestic partnership legislation for purposes of defining "rela-
tionships" in violation of local law.
Determinations of dependent status based on state law result in in-
equality in the manner in which federal tax law treats employees in commit-
ted relationships." 7 First, insofar as same-sex partners may qualify for
favorable tax treatment of health benefits only as dependents,"' gay and
lesbian employees may not exclude coverage provided to domestic partners
if those partners receive less than half of their support from the taxpayer." 9
Similarly, in the absence of a common-law marriage statute, an unmarried
heterosexual employee's domestic partner may not qualify for favorable tax
treatment unless the partner receives the requisite amount of support from
the employee.20 An employee's spouse, by contrast, need not receive any
117. See James K. Glassman, IRS Ruling a Mixed Bag on Same-Sex Benefits, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 1996, at H1 (noting unfairness that results from unequal tax treatment of
domestic partners and married couples). Glassman quotes an attorney for a gay rights group,
who opines:
It's inherently unequal and unfair for unmarried employees who receive
family health insurance to face a greater tax burden than their married colleagues
.... In essence, this is an issue of equal pay for equal work. Even if employers
provide equal benefits, those [umnarried] employees still ultimately receive less
compensation because they face a greater tax burden.
Id. (quoting Suzanne D. Goldberg, attorney with Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund
Inc.).
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing inability of same-sex couples
to marry); see also Barrios, supra note 1, at 855 (noting that common-law marriage method
of qualifying for health benefits exclusions for domestic partners is categorically unavailable
to gay and lesbian couples).
119. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 152(a)(9)
(1994)).
120. As a practical matter, however, where an opposite-sex domestic partner does not
meet the support test of Code § 152(a)(9), relief from the "marriage penalty" offsets the
inequity created by disallowing a dependency exclusion for employer-provided domestic
partner health benefits. See WILLIAM A. KLEiN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 38-41 (10th ed. 1994) (describing marriage penalty and noting that it results from
single start at bottom of more favorable rate schedule for married couple filing jointly, rather
than two separate starts at bottom of less favorable rate schedule if two had remained single);
Frederick R. Schneider, Which Tax Unit for the Federal Income Tax?, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 93, 99 (1994) (noting that combined tax liability of two single income earners increases
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specific level of support from the employee taxpayer in order for the
taxpayer to exclude coverage provided to such spouse. Second, even if a
domestic partner receives the requisite financial support to qualify as a
dependent, the domestic partner may not qualify for the exclusion due to
local laws that place the relationship between the taxpayer and the domestic
partner "in violation of local law. "
21
Although, under Code § 152(b)(5), a relationship in violation of local
law precludes a person from qualifying as a taxpayer's dependent, the
Service has offered only limited guidance as to the meaning of the local law
provision. Treasury Regulation § 1.152-1(b) merely restates the language
of Code § 152(b)(5). 22 Courts and the IRS have construed local law to
refer to state law, municipal law, or both," 3 but have not addressed the
question of which jurisdiction to look to if the laws conflict. Moreover,
cases and rulings leave certain questions unanswered - which categories
of laws apply in determining whether a "relationship" violates local law
and, more specifically, whether criminal laws prohibiting specific acts
cause a domestic relationship to fall within Code § 152(b)(5).
when they marry and file joint returns). The "marriage penalty" results when a married
couple filing jointly consists of two wage earners who earn roughly equivalent amounts. See
William M. Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J.
1495, 1502 & n.27 (1994) (explaining marriage penalty and noting its source). Compare
I.R.C. § l(a), (d) (1994) (setting income tax rates for married persons filing jointly and for
married persons filing separately) with id. § 1(c) (setting income tax rates for unmarried
individuals). Where the disparity in incomes between the employee and the domestic partner
is sufficient to meet the support requirements of Code § 152(a)(9), the domestic partner is
truly economically dependent on the employee, and the marriage penalty would not apply if
the couple married.
121. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (describing local law exception to
definition of "dependent").
122. See Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (as amended in 1971) (developing meaning of
language in I.R.C. § 152 (1994)).
123. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19, 1996) (citing Ensminger v. Commissioner,
610 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1979) as authority for deferring to state laws governing interper-
sonal relationships); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (Jul. 31, 1992) (citing Ensminger as authority
for deferring to state laws governing interpersonal relationships and noting that local laws
recognizing unmarried cohabitation should inform local law analysis); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-
060 (Mar. 1, 1991) (citing Ensminger as authority for deferring to state laws governing
interpersonal relationships); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (same); see also supra
notes 115-16 and accompanying text (explaining that Service's acknowledgement that local
law analysis should include laws recognizing unmarried cohabitation appears to account for
municipal domestic partner legislation already in place in several jurisdictions).
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IV. Application of the Local Law Requirement to
Heterosexual Relationships
In 1957, prior to the enactment of Code § 152(b)(5), the United States
Tax Court (Tax Court) ruled that courts should not interpret Code
§ 152(a)(9) to allow a dependency exemption for an individual who lives
with and receives support from a taxpayer if the relationship represents a
conscious attempt by the taxpayer to violate criminal laws in the taxpayer's
jurisdiction of residence.'24 In Turnipseed v. Commissioner," the peti-
tioner claimed for a dependency exemption a married woman living with
the taxpayer.' 26 The woman was separated, but not legally divorced, from
her husband, and she and the taxpayer lived together openly as man and
wife for the entire taxable year in question in violation of Alabama's
criminal law against adulterous cohabitation. 127 The woman also received
full financial support from the taxpayer throughout the taxable year, as
required by Code § 152(a)(9). 2
Turnzipseed represented a case of first impression for the Tax Court.129
In denying the taxpayer's dependency exemption claim, the court reasoned
124. See Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758, 760-61 (1957) (denying dependency
exemption for individual meeting requirements of Code § 152(a)(9) because relationship with
taxpayer violated state law prohibiting adulterous cohabitation).
125. 27 T.C. 758 (1957).
126. Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758, 759 (1957).
127. Id.; see also ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 16 (1940) (prohibiting heterosexual couples from
"living in adultery or fornication"). The Alabama statute stated:
If any man and woman live together in adultery or fornication, each of them
shall, on the first conviction of the offense, be fined not less than one hundred
dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard labor
for the county, for not more than six months; on the second conviction for the
offense, with the same person, the offender shall be fined not less than three
hundred dollars, and may be imprisoned in the county jail, or sentenced to hard
labor for the county, for not more than twelve months; and, on a third, or any
subsequent conviction, with the same person, shall be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary for two years.
Id. The state courts have interpreted the statute not to prohibit single or occasional acts of
criminal intimacy. See Wilson v. State, 39 So. 2d 250, 253 (Ala. Ct. App. 1948). Rather,
the parties must continue, or agree to continue, to engage in such acts before courts will deem
the relationship criminal. Id.
128. Turnipseed, 27 T.C. at 759.
129. See id. at 760 (noting that case presented new question of whether Code § 152(a)(9)
should receive literal interpretation to include as dependent an individual living in illicit
relationship with taxpayer).
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that although Code § 152(a)(9) extended the definition of dependent to
include certain persons who do not have either a blood or marriage relation
to the taxpayer, Congress never intended the provision to countenance or
encourage relationships maintained in deliberate violation of the laws of the
taxpayer's state of residence. 3° The court applied the general rule that
courts should interpret statutes sensibly in order to effectuate legislative
intent and to avoid absurd results.'
3'
Congress adopted Code § 152(b)(5) to become effective in taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1957.32 Congress, however, provided
little guidance as to what laws the courts and the Service should examine
in determining whether relationships, as opposed to individuals, violate
criminal laws. 33 The language of Code § 152(b)(5), on its face, limits the
local law analysis to "the relationship between such individual and the tax-
payer .... ,'34 Several interpretations of this language seem possible. The
possibilities include that a relationship violates local law when (1) two or
more persons engage in a prohibited activity together, (2) two or more
persons engage in a prohibited activity repeatedly or continuously, (3) two
or more persons engage in various prohibited activities together, or
(4) persons engage in activities that adversely affect legally protected
relationships, such as the marital relationship. Congress, offering only a
modicum of guidance as to what constitutes a relationship in violation of
local law, left this determination to the Service and to the courts. 35 If a
130. See id. (concluding that Congress did not intend for Code § 152(a)(9) to reward
taxpayers maintaining illicit relationships that violate criminal laws in taxpayer's jurisdiction
of residence). The Turnipseed court noted that by adding Code § 152(a)(9), Congress
intended to broaden dependency status to include certain relationships not based upon blood
or marriage. See id. (noting that legislative history provides minimal guidance as to which
individuals Congress intended to confer dependency status). For example, Congress clearly
intended to bring foster children who live with the taxpayer, but whom the taxpayer has not
yet adopted, within the definition of dependent. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 194 (1954)). However, the court explained that by denying the dependency deduc-
tion in the present case, it did not intend to imply that the foster child example in the legisla-
tive history exhausted the reach of § 152(a)(9). Id. at 761.
131. Id. at 761.
132. See S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4791, 4913 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (noting effective date of Code
§ 152(b)(5)).
133. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Code
§ 152(b)(5)).
134. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
135. See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing local law exception and
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relationship violating local law referred to either of the first three possibili-
ties above, the § 152(b)(5) exception would deny dependency status to
many individuals regularly counted as dependents because of the great
breadth of activities prohibited by state criminal laws. However, such
broad application of Code § 152(b)(5) does not appear to have been within
Congress's intent in enacting this Code section.
Since the adoption of this Code section, courts have had several
opportunities to apply the section to heterosexual relationships. The first
case considering the local law issue after codification of the local law
exception was Estate of Buckley v. Commissioner.'36 In Buckley, the Tax
Court considered whether a married male taxpayer could claim a depend-
ency exemption for a woman, not his wife, with whom he lived during the
taxable years in question.137 The taxpayer, after separating from his wife,
obtained a Mexican divorce decree.3 I Soon after obtaining the divorce
decree, the taxpayer purportedly married, in Virginia, a woman for whom
he claimed a dependency exemption in the case at issue. 39 The taxpayer
then instituted a suit for divorce from his first wife in the Superior Court
of Hartford, Connecticut, but the suit was later discontinued by stipula-
tion. " The taxpayer's first wife later brought an action for declaratory
judgment in the Supreme Court of New York County to establish her
marital status for income tax purposes. 4' Because the taxpayer's first wife
had not received notice of the Mexican divorce proceeding, the Supreme
Court of New York County set aside the resulting divorce decree as having
been obtained fraudulently.'42 The first wife then brought an action in the
Mexican court to have the divorce decree declared null and void. 143 Be-
cause the taxpayer failed to file an answer, the Mexican court declared the
original divorce suit brought by the taxpayer to be null and void ab initio.'4
Under the laws of the taxpayer's state of residence - New York - his
providing example of common-law spouse in state not recognizing common-law marriage as
violation of local law within meaning of Code § 152(b)(5)).
136. 37 T.C. 664 (1962).
137. Estate of Buckley, 37 T.C. 664, 673 (1962).
138. Id. at 665-66.
139. Id. at 668.
140. Id. at 666.
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Virginia marriage to the woman for whom he claimed a dependency ex-
emption was null and void.145 The taxpayer cohabited with and supported
this woman during the entirety of the taxable years in which the taxpayer
claimed a dependency exemption for the woman. 14 6 In denying the depend-
ency exemption, the Tax Court cited both Turnipseed and Code § 152(b)(5)
as authorities for the proposition that Congress did not intend to permit
exemptions for individuals with whom a taxpayer maintains an illicit - in
this case, adulterous - relationship. 47
The Tax Court again addressed the local law issue in Untermann v.
Commissioner."'I The facts in Untermann were similar to those in Buckley.
The taxpayer married a woman in Nevada after she obtained a Nevada
decree of divorce from her previous husband. 149 The couple took up resi-
dence in New Jersey."' Several years later, the taxpayer and the woman
separated, and the taxpayer obtained a Mexican decree of divorce.'
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer married another woman, and the new
couple took up residence in New Jersey.' 52 The taxpayer's first wife then
filed an action in New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Mexican divorce was invalid and seeking to establish her legal status as the
taxpayer's wife.'53 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed the
woman's complaint due to her fraudulent conduct in obtaining the Nevada
decree of divorce from her previous husband, the court also declared
invalid the taxpayer's Mexican decree of divorce from his first wife. 54 The
Tax Court considered whether the taxpayer could claim a dependency
exemption for the taxpayer's second wife for the taxable years at issue. 55
In denying the dependency exemption, the Tax Court noted that under the
law of the taxpayer's state of residence - New Jersey - his first marriage
145. See id. at 672 (declaring taxpayer's second marriage null and void under New York
domestic relations law); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 6 (McKinney 1988) (declaring void
any marriage of person previously married, unless other party to prior marriage died or court
of competent jurisdiction annulled or dissolved prior marriage).
146. Buckley, 37 T.C. at 673.
147. Id.
148. 38 T.C. 93 (1962).






155. Id. at 96-97.
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was still in effect. 156 Therefore, the court concluded that the taxpayer was
not legally married to the woman for whom he claimed the dependency
exemption and that the couple's adulterous cohabitation during the taxable
years violated local law. 57
Two 1964 Tax Court memorandum decisions also denied dependency
exemptions for women with whom the taxpayers lived in adulterous rela-
tionships. 5 In Davis v. Commissioner,'59 the Tax Court denied a depend-
ency exemption for a woman with whom a male taxpayer cohabited as
husband and wife and who, during the taxable years at issue, was in the
process of obtaining a divorce from her previous husband."6° In Wondsel
v. Commissioner,16 1 the Tax Court denied a dependency exemption for a
woman with whom the taxpayer cohabited as husband and wife because the
Supreme Court of the State of New York - a court in the taxpayer's state
of residence - previously had declared null and void the taxpayer's decree
of divorce from his prior wife. 62
156. Id. at 96.
157. See id. at 97 (denying dependency exemption for woman who cohabited with
married taxpayer in adulterous relationship).
158. See generally Wondsel v. Commissioner, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCII) 1278
(1964) (denying dependency exemption for woman with whom taxpayer lived in adulterous
relationship); Davis v. Commissioner, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1099 (1964) (same).
For further information regarding the Wondsel and Davis cases, see infra notes 159-62 and
accompanying text.
Tax Court memorandum decisions differ from regular Tax Court decisions in that
memorandum decisions "involv[e] well-established legal issues," whereas regular decisions
present important legal issues that the court has not settled. See GAIL L. RICHMOND,
FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 77 (4th ed. 1990). No
official reporters publish memorandum decisions, but several private publishers print them.
Id.
159. 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1099 (1964).
160. See Davis v. Commissioner, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1099, 1100 (1964)
(denying dependency exemption for woman who lived with taxpayer, but maintained marriage
with another man). In Davis, the Tax Court considered whether the taxpayer could claim a
dependency exemption for a married woman who lived with an unmarried taxpayer. Id.
During the taxable years in issue, the taxpayer and the woman lived together as husband and
wife, but the taxpayer did not marry the woman until a later date. Id. In denying the
dependency deduction, the Tax Court relied on Turnipseed and Code § 152(b)(5) and noted
that the woman was in the process of obtaining a divorce from another man during the taxable
years involved. Id.
161. 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1278 (1964).
162. See Wondsel v. Commissioner, 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCII) 1278, 1284 (1964)
(denying dependency exemption for woman with whom married taxpayer lived in adulterous
relationship). In Wondsel, the Tax Court considered whether a male taxpayer could claim
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The Buckley, Untermann, Davis, and Wondsel decisions all involved
cases in which the taxpayer claimed a dependency exemption for an indi-
vidual who lived with the taxpayer in an adulterous relationship. In deny-
ing dependent status to individuals who maintained such relationships, the
Tax Court decided these cases consistent with its analysis in Turnipseed.
Subsequently, however, the Tax Court began to employ a more expansive
interpretation of the § 152(b)(5) local law exception by denying dependency
status on the basis of presumptions regarding the sexual nature of couples'
relationships and on the basis of state statutes prohibiting specific sex acts.
In Eichbauer v. Commissioner,63 the Tax Court, in a memorandum
decision, invoked a state statute prohibiting lewd cohabitation to deny a
dependency deduction for an unmarried woman who cohabited with an
unmarried male taxpayer.1" The couple represented their relationship to
the community as a common-law marriage. 65 However, the state in which
the couple resided did not recognize common-law marriages, and the
a dependency exemption for a woman with whom he cohabited during the taxable years in
issue. Id. The taxpayer had married his first wife in 1927. Id. at 1278. In 1936, the
taxpayer entered into a written separation agreement with his first wife, and in 1937, the
taxpayer obtained a final decree of divorce from his first wife in the Circuit Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. Id. at 1279. In 1939, the taxpayer married his second
wife in Connecticut. Id. Two years later, the taxpayer's first wife obtained an order from
the Supreme Court of the State of New York that proclaimed the taxpayer's Florida divorce
decree void and the taxpayer's subsequent marriage void and declared the first wife to be the
taxpayer's lawful wife. Id. at 1279-80. In 1946, the taxpayer entered a written separation
agreement with his second wife and, soon thereafter, obtained from the Circuit Court of the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida a final decree of divorce from his second wife. Id. at
1280-81. Later that same year, the taxpayer married his third wife in New Jersey. Id. at
1281. In an action initiated by the taxpayer's third wife, the Supreme Court of Westchester
County, New York, ordered the third marriage annulled in 1961 on the ground that the
taxpayer still maintained a marriage to his first wife. Id. The court considered whether the
taxpayer could claim a dependency exemption for his third wife for the taxable years in
issue. Id. at 1284. In denying the dependency exemption, the Tax Court held that the first
Florida divorce decree did not create the status of divorce between the taxpayer and his first
wife because the taxpayer, his first wife, and his second wife were all residents of the State
of New York when the Supreme Court of the State of New York ordered the Florida divorce
decree void. Id. at 1282-83. Because the taxpayer's marriage to his first wife never
terminated, the taxpayer's marriages to his second and third wives were invalid. Id. Citing
Turnipseed, Untermann, and Code § 152(b)(5), the Tax Court determined that the commis-
sioner had properly denied the taxpayer's dependency exemption for his third wife. Id. at
1284.
163. 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 581 (1971).
164. Eichbauer v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCII) 581, 583 (1971).
165. Id. at 582.
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couple had not legally contracted a marriage in any other state. 16  There-
fore, the taxpayer could not claim a spousal deduction for the woman. The
court further noted that Congress had addressed the couple's particular
situation - a common-law marriage in a state that does not recognize such
marriages - in its legislative deliberations and that Congress concluded
that neither partner in such a relationship would qualify as a dependent of
the other.167 Therefore, the taxpayer could not claim a dependency deduc-
tion for the woman either.
The Eichbauer court, however, did not end its analysis with this
conclusion. It reinforced its conclusion denying a dependency deduction
by referring to Washington's lewd cohabitation statute.'68 The court
explained that two persons violate the statute prohibiting lewd and lascivi-
ous cohabitation when they live together and commit adultery or fornication
or when two unmarried persons live together as husband and wife. 69 The
court declared that the relationship between the woman and the taxpayer,
because it may have violated the lewd cohabitation statute, violated local
law so as to preclude the woman's dependency status. 70 The court's
presumption, in the absence of any evidence, that the relationship between
the woman and the taxpayer involved a sexual element so as to violate the
lewd cohabitation statute started courts' slide down the slippery slope of
denying dependency status based on the local law exception. Eichbauer
further explained that the court must deny the dependency deduction despite
the failure of the taxpayer's state of residence to prosecute the couple under
166. Id.
167. Id.; see also infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of Code § 152(b)(5)).
168. Eichbauer, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCI-) at 583 (citing WASH. REv. CODE
§ 9.79.120 (1950), which prohibits lewd cohabitation with someone other than spouse). The
statute read: "Every person who shall lewdly and viciously cohabit with another not the
husband or wife of such person. . . shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor." WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.79.120 (1950). The crime of lewd and lascivious cohabitation generally entails
"[l]iving together in adultery or fornication" or "cohabiting together as husband and wife
without being married." 53 C.J.S. Lewdness § 5 (1987) (citations omitted); see also 25
WORns AND PHRASEs Lewd and Lascivious Cohabitation 36 (1961). The purpose of a lewd
and lascivious cohabitation statute is "to prohibit the public scandal and disgrace of the living
together of persons of opposite sexes, not married to each other, in such illicit intimacy as
to outrage public decency and to have a demoralizing and debasing influence on society."
53 C.IS. Lewdness § 5 (1987).
169. Eichbauer, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 583; see also supra note 168 (discuss-
ing crime of lewd and lascivious cohabitation).
170. Eichbauer, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 583.
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the lewd cohabitation statute and despite the acceptance of the couple's
relationship by the couple's community of residence. 171 Thus, by relying on
the statute to deny a dependency deduction, the court directly involved the
federal government in the enforcement of the state's lewd cohabitation
statute by means of a federal tax penalty.
Another Tax Court memorandum opinion addressed the local law issue
in Martin v. Commissioner.'" In Martin, the court denied an unmarried
male taxpayer a dependency exemption for an unmarried woman with whom
the taxpayer lived and whom he supported for just over a single year, after
which the taxpayer made the woman leave the residence.'73 The taxpayer
did not contend that the couple had ever legally married.174 Nevertheless,
the couple made no secret of their cohabitation."5 On the taxpayer's tax
return for the year in which the woman lived with him, the taxpayer, al-
though listing his status as single, attempted to claim a spousal exemption for
the woman.' 76 Because the woman obviously did not qualify as the tax-
payer's spouse, the court denied the exemption.'"
The court then analyzed whether the taxpayer could claim a dependency
exemption for the woman. 7 1 In denying the dependency exemption, the
court explained that the Report of the House Ways and Means Committee
that addressed Code § 152(b)(5) clearly explained that Congress intended to
deny dependency exemptions to those persons unrelated to the taxpayer by
blood or marriage, but living with the taxpayer, when the couple is not
married. '9 However, the court's reading of the House report seems to be
an unwarranted interpretation of the actual language in the report, which
declared that "a 'common-law wife' where the applicable State law does not
recognize common-law marriages would not qualify as a dependent of the
taxpayer. " 1° The Tax Court reasoned that allowing the taxpayer an exemp-
171. Id.
172. 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 656 (1973).
173. Martin v. Commissioner, 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 656, 658 (1973).
174. Id. at 657.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 658.
178. Id. at 657-58.
179. Id. at 657 (citing H. REP. No. 775, 85th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (1957), reprinted in
1958-3 C.B. 811, 818 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT], which mirrors language of SENATE
REPORT, supra note 132).
180. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 179, at 7-8, reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 811, 817-18. The
House report states:
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tion in this situation would result in allowing the taxpayer two attempts to
claim an exemption - the dependency exemption being a fallback position
if the relationship between the taxpayer and the person living with the
taxpayer did not rise to the level of a common-law marriage. s' According
to the court, the legislative history of the Code provision negated such an
intent by Congress.' The court further supported its conclusion by refer-
ence to certain criminal laws of each of the three states in which the couple
had lived during the taxable year that rendered what the court assumed to
have been the couple's relationship violative of local law."m The court cited
statutes prohibiting adultery, fornication, and lewd and lascivious cohabita-
tion." Because the taxpayer's relationship with the woman may have
violated these criminal statutes, the Tax Court, following Eichbauer's lead,
concluded that the taxpayer could not claim a dependency exemption for the
woman. 185
[A] person who is not a close relative but is living with the taxpayer may not be
claimed as a dependent if the relationship between the taxpayer and the individual is
an illegal one under the applicable local law. For example, this would make it clear
that an individual who is a "common-law wife" where the applicable State law does not
recognize common-law marriages would not qualify as a dependent of the taxpayer.
Id. (emphasis added). In order to qualify as a common-law spouse in states that recognize
common-law marriage, a couple must meet certain statutorily defined requirements. See
Barrios, supra note 1, at 854 n.59 (noting that states recognizing common-law marriages
differ in how they define such unions). Generally, common-law marriage statutes require that
the couple agree to be husband and wife, live together, and hold themselves out to the public
as husband and wife. See id. (citing 1 LYNN D. WARDLE ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY
LAW § 3, at 18 (1988)). Therefore, it seems that Congress's example in the Senate report
referred to relationships in which the members, in addition to living together, also make the
required agreement between themselves and the required representations to the public.
181. See Martin, 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 657 (explaining that Congress did not
intend to allow "two bites at the exemption apple" when relationship does not rise to level of
marriage or common-law marriage).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 657-58.
184. See id. (citing ALA. CODE § 14-16 (1959) (prohibiting cohabiting in adultery or
fornication); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 798.01, .02, .03 (West 1965) (criminalizing adultery, lewd
and lascivious cohabitation, and fornication, respectively); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras.
11.7, .8 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (prohibiting adultery and fornication, respectively)). "Fornica-
tion" generally refers to voluntary or illicit sexual intercourse between a man and a woman,
whether between married or unmarried persons. See 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 1 (1943 &
Supp. 1995); 17 WoRDS AND PHRASES Fornication 578 (1958). Generally, a single act of
illicit sexual intercourse suffices to constitute the criminal offense of fornication, whereas
lewd and lascivious cohabitation generally entails habitual acts of illicit intercourse. 37
C.J.S. Fornication § 1 (1943 & Supp. 1995).
185. Martin, 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCI-) at 657-58.
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The Tax Court again addressed the local law exception in Peacock v.
Commissioner,8 6 another memorandum decision. In Peacock, an unmarried
male taxpayer attempted to claim a spousal exemption for an unmarried
woman with whom the taxpayer cohabited."S The taxpayer admitted that the
relationship between the couple constituted neither a legal nor a common-law
marriage. 8 Furthermore, neither of the two states in which the couple had
lived during the taxable year recognized common-law marriage.8 9 Nonethe-
less, the taxpayer argued that the woman was his "spouse" within the mean-
ing of the dictionary definition of the term because the couple contracted to
raise jointly any children that they might have together.19 The Tax Court,
rejecting this argument, noted that the word "spouse," as used in the Code,
refers to a husband or wife legally married to the taxpayer.' 9 '
The taxpayer in Peacock also argued, in the alternative, that he could
claim a dependency exemption for the woman under Code § 152(a)(9)."
The court denied the dependency exemption on the ground that the relation-
ship between the couple violated an Arizona statute criminalizing open and
notorious cohabitation."3 Explaining its decision, the court noted that the
open and notorious cohabitation offense punishes "open and notorious
conduct which offends the moral sense of the public" and that it operates
independently of any harm that might result to an injured spouse. 1 There-
fore, in order to have violated the statute, the couple must have lived to-
gether both openly and continuously. 9" Because the couple had three
children born to them while they lived together, the court concluded that the
relationship violated the criminal statute and, thus, violated local law within
the meaning of Code § 152(b)(5).'I
186. 37 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 177, 180-83 (1978).
187. Peacock v. Commissioner, 37 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 177, 181 (1978).
188. Id. at 179.
189. Id. at 181-82.
190. Id. at 180-81.
191. Id. at 181.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 182-83 (citing Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-222 (1956) (prohibiting open
and notorious cohabitation or adultery)).
194. Id. at 182 (quoting State v. Griffin, 118 P.2d 676, 677 (Ariz. 1941)).
195. Id.
196. See id. (noting that couple's failure to publicize unmarried status and woman's use
of taxpayer's last name constituted insufficient evidence to prove that relationship did not
violate statute).
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The most recent decision in which the Tax Court addressed the local
law exception to Code § 152(b)(5) was the memorandum decision in Nicho-
las v. Commissioner.' In Nicholas, the Tax Court concluded that a woman
who lived with a male taxpayer and who voluntarily engaged in sexual
intercourse with the taxpayer did not qualify as a dependent under Code
§ 152(b)(5) analysis. '98 The state statute that disqualified the woman from
dependent status prohibited unmarried persons from voluntarily engaging in
sexual intercourse.'" The court first concluded that the relationship between
the woman and the taxpayer clearly did not amount to a common-law mar-
riage under the applicable state common-law marriage statute. ° Prior to the
taxable year at issue, the woman had accepted an engagement ring from the
taxpayer. 2 ' However, she refused to marry the taxpayer immediately
because of difficulties that she had experienced in her previous marriage.2
The woman remained engaged to the taxpayer throughout the entire taxable
year at issue, and the couple intended to marry in the future. 233
Given these facts, the court concluded that the taxpayer could not claim
a spousal exemption for the woman because the relationship did not arise
"out of a contract between two consenting parties" as it lacked a vital ele-
ment required by the state common-law marriage statute - that the couple
"mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations."'  According to
the court, the woman's reluctance to marry the taxpayer until a future date
demonstrated that she was unwilling during the taxable year to assume the
legal rights, duties, and obligations of marriage.'5 Therefore, the relation-
ship did not amount to a common-law marriage under the applicable Utah
law. The court further concluded that the taxpayer could not claim a de-
pendency exemption for the woman because the taxpayer admitted that the
couple cohabited and engaged in sexual relations during the taxable year in
issue in violation of the state law prohibiting fornication.'
197. 62 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCII) 467 (1991).
198. Nicholas v. Commissioner, 62 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 467, 469 (1991).
199. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1990) (criminalizing fornication).
200. Nicholas, 62 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 469.
201. Id. at 468.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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By denying a dependency exemption on the basis of a statute prohibiting
fornication, the Nicholas court further expanded the Tax Court's interpreta-
tion of the local law exception to encompass isolated criminal sex acts.'
Previously, the Martin court had presented the possibility of denying de-
pendency status based upon fornication statutes, but the Martin decision did
not depend on the validity of such an approach. 8 The Nicholas decision
failed to explain how the violation of statutes prohibiting isolated criminal
sex acts could place a relationship in violation of local law. 9
Two other courts also have addressed the local law exception of Code
§ 152(b)(5). In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit addressed the local law exception in Ensminger v. Commissioner.210
In Ensminger, the Fourth Circuit concluded that habitual sexual relations
between an unmarried male taxpayer and an unmarried woman who lived
with and received support from the taxpayer violated local law within the
meaning of Code § 152(b)(5).2 ' The statute in question prohibited a man
and a woman, not married to each other, from "lewdly and lasciviously
associat[ing], bed[ding] and cohabit[ing] together."2 12 The court reasoned
that denying the dependency deduction in this situation was consistent with
the deference that Congress normally gives to the states in matters of "mar-
riage, family life and domestic affairs."213 Thus, the Fourth Circuit inter-
preted the term "local" in the local law exception to refer to laws of the
taxpayer's state, or territory, of residence. 24  Furthermore, Ensminger
207. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 856 & n.67 (noting that Martin's interpretation of
"local law" as including statutes prohibiting specific sex acts expands term to include laws
that "have nothing to do with the domestic relationship on its face").
208. See supra note 184 (listing several statutes that Martin court cited as possibilities
to render taxpayer's relationship with woman violative of local law).
209. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 857 (distinguishing relationship between individuals
from specific sexual acts or sexual relations in which individuals might engage).
210. 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979).
211. Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 190-92 (4th Cir. 1979).
212. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1978).
213. Ensminger, 610 F.2d at 191.
214. See id. (noting that Congress leaves determination of legality of interpersonal
relationships to individual states). "Congress undertook no determination of the legality of
any kind of interpersonal relationship. Section 152(b)(5) leaves that determination entirely
to the individual states and assures that Congress will not appear to reward behavior which
may be in contravention of state law." Id. The court recognized that federal deference to
state laws in these matters would result in great diversity and inequality in the taxation of
individuals but justified such a result by noting the importance of treating taxpayers in their
personal relationships in the same manner that their state of residence treats them. Id.; see
also Barrios, supra note 1, at 855 & n.64 (stating that Ensminger resolves ambiguity of term
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determined that the term "law" refers to laws governing domestic rela-
tions.21 5
The Ensminger court explained that Congress and the Tax Court be-
lieved that they should not grant federal tax advantages to cohabiting couples
who are unmarried under the law of their particular state of residence.216 In
reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted the legislative history underly-
ing Code § 152(b)(5) to mean that Congress intended to deny dependency
deductions for taxpayers' partners if the partners lived in a "quasi-marital
relationship, which is illicit under the laws of the state in which they
reside."217 As was the case in Martin, however, this interpretation of Con-
gress's intention seems to be an unwarranted expansion of the legislative
history's actual language.21
The Fourth Circuit cited the Tax Court's decision in Turnipseed as
additional support for its conclusion in Ensminger."9 However, Turnipseed
involved a married woman living with a man who was not her husband.'
The adulterous relationship in Turnipseed, which the Tax Court deemed a
violation of local law within the meaning of the Code exception, is distin-
guishable from the relationship involved in the Ensminger case. An adulter-
ous relationship interferes directly with family life and the marital relation-
ship, which Congress specifically left to be governed by the states." The
relationship in Ensminger, by contrast, did not directly interfere with any
marital relationship.
In Shackelford v. United States,' the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Missouri considered whether an unmarried
female taxpayer who, during the entire taxable year in issue, lived with and
supported an unmarried man could claim a dependency exemption for the
"local law" in Code § 152(b)(5) context).
215. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 856 & n.65 (citing Ensminger as leading authority for
proposition that local law analysis includes domestic relations law of taxpayer's state of
residence).
216. Ensminger, 610 F.2d at 191.
217. Id.
218. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (explaining that legislative history
actually only specifies instance of individual who, in addition to living with taxpayer, holds
self out as common-law spouse and makes agreement with taxpayer to be husband and wife).
219. Ensminger, 610 F.2d at 191.
220. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing Tumipseed).
221. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing federal government's
deference to state laws in matters affecting marriage and domestic affairs).
222. 3 B.R. 42 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
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man.223 If the taxpayer could have claimed the dependency deduction, the
commissioner's deficiency assessment against the taxpayer would have been
dischargeable.' The couple in the case had never represented themselves
to be husband and wife, and the public had never known the extent of the
couple's intimate relationship.' The court examined Missouri's gross
lewdness statute to determine whether the couple's relationship violated local
law within the meaning of Code § 152(b)(5).2' The IRS argued that Con-
gress did not intend for Code § 152(a)(9) to provide a dependency exemption
when an individual lives with a taxpayer in a relationship that is "inferior"
to a common-law marriage. 27 In rejecting the Service's argument, the court
explained that in the absence of state legislation to the contrary, the federal
bankruptcy court should not make moral determinations about whether
relationships that do not qualify as common-law marriages are better or
worse than relationships that meet such standards.' The court further noted
that the Missouri legislature had not prohibited the cohabitation of a man and
a woman under the facts presented in the case. 9
223. Shackelford v. United States, 3 B.R. 42, 43-45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
224. Id. at 43.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 44-45 (examining Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.150 (Vernon 1953)). The
Missouri statute at issue provided:
Every person who shall live in a state of open and notorious adultery, and
every man and woman, one or both of whom are married, and not to each other, who
shall lewdly and lasciviously abide and cohabit with each other, and every person,
married or unmarried, who shall be guilty of open, gross lewdness or lascivious
behavior, or of any open and notorious act of public indecency, grossly scandalous,
shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.150 (Vernon 1953).
227. Shackelford, 3 B.R. at 44.
228. Id.
229. See id. (noting that Missouri's gross lewdness statute, see supra note 226, came
closest of any state statutes to outlawing couple's relationship). The Shackelford court did
not specifically state how, under the facts of this case, the couple's relationship did not violate
local law. Presumably, the court meant that the couple's conduct did not rise to the level of
open or gross lewdness necessary to implicate the statute because the couple privately con-
ducted all intimacies in which they may have engaged. However, the court seemed to suggest
that a sexual relationship between a man and woman living together outside of marriage,
without more, should never be construed as lewdness. See id. (suggesting modern society's
general acceptance of premarital sexual relations and cohabitation). The court states:
[I]n this day and age, can it be said that merely living together is open, gross lewd-
ness or lascivious behavior? Does this conduct openly outrage decency? Is it
injurious to public morals? Would the language in State v. Bess, 20 Mo. 420 (1855)
"What act can be more grossly lewd or lascivious than for a man and woman, not
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The Service also argued that the legislative history underlying Code
§ 152(b)(5) clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to allow a depend-
ency exemption to a taxpayer who lives in a "sexual relationship with
another individual with absolutely no family or quasi-family ties."2 In
rejecting this argument, the court noted that the legislative history discusses
only two specific situations - one that involved a foster child and one that
involved a common-law marriageT 1 The court further explained that a
relationship is not illegal simply because a jurisdiction does not affirmatively
validate the relationship. 2  The court determined that so long as the cou-
ple's conduct did not rise to the level of lewdness that would violate the
Missouri statute, the couple's relationship did not violate local law.'
Therefore, the taxpayer could claim a dependency exemption for the man
with whom she lived.'
The Shackelford decision was the first court decision interpreting Code
§ 152(b)(5) to take a more limited view of the local law exception after the
Tax Court had expanded its reach from invalidating adulterous relationships
to invalidating relationships among any unmarried cohabiting partners in
sexual relationships. The Shackelford analysis reflects a more modem view
of sexual relations between opposite-sex partners outside of marriage. 5
This modem view of general acceptance toward unmarried cohabiting
couples should influence the Service as it makes its local law determinations
as to the excludability of employer-provided domestic partner health bene-
fits.
V. Application of the Local Law Exception to Domestic
Partner Health Benefits
The first requirement that a domestic partner must satisfy in order to
qualify as a dependent under Code § 152 is to receive at least half of total
married to each other, to be living together and cohabiting with each other," still be
applicable today? I think not.
Id.
230. Id. at 45.
231. Id.; see also supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
history of Code § 152(b)(5)); supra note 130 (discussing legislative intent of Code
§ 152(a)(9)).
232. Shackelford, 3 B.R. at 45.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See infra note 256 (discussing states' and public's current view about unmarried
cohabitation).
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financial support for the taxable year from the taxpayer. 6 If the domestic
partner does not qualify as a dependent under this requirement, the taxpayer
may not claim the partner as a dependent, and the analysis ends. If the
partner does qualify at this stage, the analysis moves to Code § 152(b)(5) to
determine whether the relationship maintained between the taxpayer and the
dependent violates local law. 7
The courts have not yet had an opportunity to apply Code § 152(b)(5)
specifically to domestic partner health benefits plans."s One commentator
notes that the courts will likely defer to the Service's analysis of the tax
treatment of such plans as evidenced in the recent private letter rulings
described above. 9 If this is true, it is important for the Service to provide
a thorough analysis of the local law exception. The courts have applied an
expansive interpretation of Code § 152(b)(5) to deny dependency status to
cohabiting heterosexual couples.24° This broad interpretation suggests that
the courts, in the absence of a contrary ruling by the Service, are likely to
deny dependency status to both same-sex and heterosexual domestic partners
based on presumed violations of statutes criminalizing sodomy, fornication,
and lewd and lascivious cohabitation." By contrast, although IRS letter
236. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing Code § 152(a)(9), which
qualifies member of taxpayer's household who receives over half of financial support from
taxpayer for taxable year as taxpayer's dependent).
237. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing local law exception of Code
§ 152(b)(5)).
238. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 851 (noting that courts have not yet considered
domestic partner benefits issue).
239. See id. (noting that courts will likely defer to Service's application of Code to
domestic partner health benefits in private letter ruling analyses if such analyses represent
permissible constructions of Code); supra notes 91-116, 123 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing IRS's private letter rulings).
240. See supra notes 163-221 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
have applied broad reading of local law exception).
241. Twenty-three states currently have statutes on their books that criminalize consen-
sual sodomy. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1994); ARiz. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411
to -1412 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 800.02
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986);
MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW §§ 553-554 (1992); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 34
(West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158, .338 (West 1991); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.293 (West 1987); MSS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.090
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101, -5-505 (1995); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 201.190 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886
(West 1983 & Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120
(Law. Co-op. 1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01, .06 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.
342
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rulings do not provide a complete analysis of the local law exception, the
rulings generally express an accommodating attitude by the Service toward
domestic partnerships.242 However, the Service's position on dependency
status for domestic partners is far from clear, and the courts' past expansive
interpretation of the local law exception injects an element of uncertainty into
how the Service will finally determine the issue.243
Several factors suggest that the Service should attach little significance
to the courts' expansive interpretation of Code § 152(b)(5) in determining
how to treat domestic partnerships. First, Congress adopted the local law
exception as a response to the Turnipseed case.244 The only authoritative
decisions interpreting the exception following its enactment considered the
same issue that the Turnipseed case addressed - a cohabiting heterosexual
couple, in which one of the individuals was married.245 The series of cases
that expanded the reach of the local law exception to exclude cohabiting
unmarried individuals from dependency exemptions constitutes weak author-
§ 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-361 (Michie Supp. 1995); see also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding, in 5-4 decision, state's power to prohibit
consensual sodomy).
Several states outlaw unlawful cohabitation. See generally 53 C.J.S. Lewdness § 5
(1987) (describing crime of lewd cohabitation and listing states that have lewd cohabitation
statutes). Several states also outlaw fornication. See generally 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 1
(1943 & Supp. 1995) (describing crime of fornication and listing states that have statutes
prohibiting fornication).
242. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992) (suggesting that local law analysis
may take account of laws that affirmatively recognize unmarried cohabitation). Compare
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (Aug. 24, 1990) (providing that taxpayer must include in gross
income fair market value, determined by value that domestic partner would pay for individual
policy in arms-length transaction, of health coverage provided to domestic partner not
meeting support requirements of Code § 152(a)(9)) with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Jan. 19,
1996) (providing that taxpayer may include in gross income fair market value of group
medical coverage extended to domestic partner not meeting support requirements of Code
§ 152(a)(9), when coverage provided to domestic partner is group medical coverage) and
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (July 31, 1992) (same) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Mar. 1,
1991) (same). But see Barrios, supra note 1, at 864-65 (concluding that rulings indicate that
Service will likely defer to selectively enforced fornication, sodomy, and lewd cohabitation
statutes in applying local law exception to domestic partnerships).
243. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 858 (noting that lack of authoritative Service rulings
and court cases renders unclear applicability of local law as disqualifying factor for dependent
status of domestic partners); cf. id. at 865 n.127 (noting that Service exercises great discretion
in deciding among laws to examine in local law analysis).
244. The Tax Court decided the Turnipseed case in 1957, and Congress enacted Code
§ 152(b)(5) in 1958.
245. See supra notes 136-57 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley and Untermann).
I
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ity.' These facts suggest that Congress intended for the local law exception
to receive a more limited application and that the Service should disregard
the expansive analysistaken by the courts.
However, although Congress may have intended a narrower interpreta-
tion than the exception has received, the legislative history underlying the
exception suggests that Congress did not intend to limit the reading of Code
§ 152(b)(5) solely to the adulterous cohabitation situation addressed in
Turnipseed.47 The Eichbauer, Martin, and Ensminger decisions relied on
the legislative history to deny dependency exemptions for unmarried individ-
uals who cohabited with unmarried taxpayers in states that did not recognize
common-law marriages.' As the Martin court explained its interpretation
of the legislative history, Congress did not intend to allow a taxpayer "two
bites at the exemption apple"' 9 - a second attempt to obtain a tax benefit
by fitting a cohabiting partner into the definition of dependent if the partner
could not qualify as a taxpayer's legal spouse. However, as previously
discussed, the plain language of the legislative history does not reveal any
intention to exalt marriage relationships over any other relationship in which
two people cohabit. The language merely states that an example of a rela-
tionship that violates local law is a common-law marriage type of relation-
ship in a state that does not recognize common-law marriage.' Because
Congress cites this type of relationship only as an example of a relationship
that would violate local law, the courts, using this example as a guideline,
had to determine for themselves what other relationships might violate local
246. See supra note 158 (discussing weak precedential value of Tax Court memorandum
decisions); see also RICHMOND, supra note 158, at 77 (noting that tax dispute resolution via
federal circuit route allows for forum shopping because U.S. Supreme Court reviews very
few Courts of Appeals decisions). The Tax Court will follow circuit court precedent with
which the Tax Court disagrees only if the same circuit court has appellate jurisdiction over
the particular claim. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970) (noting that
"efficient and harmonious judicial administration" mandates that Tax Court follow circuit
court precedent when that circuit court has appellate jurisdiction over claim).
247. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Code § 152(b)(5)).
248. See Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 (1979) (citing legislative
history of § 152(b)(5) for authority that Congress intended to deny dependency status to
unmarried individual cohabiting with unmarried taxpayer); Martin v. Commissioner, 32 Tax
Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 656, 657 (1973) (same); Eichbauer v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct.
Mem. Dec. (CCH) 581, 582 (1971) (same).
249. Martin, 32 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 657; see supra note 181 and accompany-
ing text (discussing "two-bites" theory).
250. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Code § 152(b)(5)).
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law. However, the courts seem to have reached beyond the scope of the
guidelines set by this example in determining what constitutes a "relationship
in violation of local law" under the Code exception.
The Shackelford decision supports the conclusion that a relationship is
not automatically illegal absent specific validation of the relationship by the
jurisdiction in which the couple resides.7 1 In Shackelford, the jurisdiction
in which the taxpayer resided did not criminalize the cohabitation of unmar-
ried couples in sexual relationships.' The court noted, however, that other
jurisdictions do criminalize such relationships and that unmarried cohabiting
couples in those jurisdictions would not be able to sustain dependency
deductions for their partners. 3 However, the local law exception should not
act to deny dependency status to cohabiting partners regardless of whether
the taxpayer's jurisdiction of residence statutorily prohibits lewd cohabitation
or specific sex acts.
In Ensminger, the Fourth Circuit revealed the policy that underlies the
local law exception to qualification as a taxpayer's dependent.' The court
stated that the local law exception was an attempt by Congress to insure that
in applying the federal tax laws, Congress treated the intimate and personal
relationships of taxpayers in the same manner in which the taxpayer's state
of residence treated them.' s In order to effectuate this congressional policy,
courts should look beyond the letter of state law and look at how the states
actually apply state laws criminalizing specific sex acts and sexual cohabita-
tion among consenting adults. States rarely enforce these criminal statutes,
and the statutes have fallen into disfavor in most jurisdictions."56 Therefore,
251. See Shackelford v. United States, 3 B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (rejecting
Service's argument that unmarried individuals who cohabit in sexual relationship automati-
cally maintain illegal relationship absent common-law marriage statute).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating
Congress's intention to allow state governance of interpersonal relationships).
255. Id.
256. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (noting that statute
prohibiting private homosexual sodomy had history of nonenforcement that implied "mori-
bund character" of laws criminalizing private, consensual conduct in today's society); DONAL
E.J. MACNAMAA & EDWARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAw 187-88 (1977) (noting
that jurisdictions that have not repealed laws prohibiting fornication have ceased enforcing
those laws and that public no longer supports such laws); William A. Reppy, Jr., Property
and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status,
44 LA. L. REv. 1677, 1680-81 & n.18 (1984) (mentioning state trend to repeal laws prohibit-
ing consensual sexual conduct between heterosexual adult partners and noting that modem
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the courts' denial of dependent status to domestic partners on the basis of
existing lewd cohabitation statutes and statutes prohibiting specific sex acts
constitutes the federal government's enforcement, through federal tax law,
of laws that the states have decided no longer to enforce. If the Ensminger
court was correct in stating that Congress intended not to interfere in states'
governance of interpersonal relationships, the proper analysis of the local
law exception would take into account states' history of not enforcing these
statutes.
Another factor that dictates against bringing lewd cohabitation and
criminal sex statutes into the Service's local law analysis is the onerous
burden that such an expansive interpretation places upon the taxpayer to
prove entitlement to a tax benefit based on dependency. The courts, in the
absence of any proof of sexual relations between couples, have been willing
to presume that couples violate the criminal statutes provided that the court
can establish that the individuals cohabit and are not married.' In most
cases involving federal income tax disputes, the IRS is presumptively cor-
rect, and taxpayers bear the burden of proof in contesting tax assessments.'
Therefore, taxpayers claiming deductions, exemptions, or exclusions on the
basis of dependency relationships bear the burden of proving that their
relationships do not violate local laws. 9 In the cases addressing the local
law exception, however, requiring taxpayers to justify the legality of rela-
tionships that the taxpayers maintain seems to be an overly onerous burden,
society does not have interest in punishing cohabitants); Barrios, supra note 1, at 858
(explaining that many states retain laws prohibiting consensual sex acts as part of their
criminal codes, but states usually do not enforce these provisions). Many of the states'
criminal sex statutes are unclear as to what acts they prohibit and as to which couples they
affect. See id. at 858 & n.76. Furthermore, some states have specifically held such statutes
to be facially invalid. See id. at 858 & n.77; see also Bowman & Cornish, supra note 2, at
1183 n.94 (stating that Supreme Court came close to declaring right to premarital sex in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), by allowing unmarried individuals right of access
to contraception); cf id. at 1183 (noting that majority of modem American society no longer
considers premarital or extramarital sex inherently immoral).
257. See supra notes 170-71, 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing Eichbauer and
Martin courts' presumptions that relationships between taxpayers and claimed dependents in
those cases included sexual relations).
258. See Paschal v. Bleiden, 127 F.2d 398, 401-02, 404 (8th Cir. 1942) (placing burden
of proof on taxpayer in appeal of deficiency assessment); Willcuts v. Minnesota Tribune Co.,
103 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1939) (same); Aaron T. Vance, 36 T.C. 547, 549 (1961) (same);
KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra note 120, at 88 (noting that Commissioner's determination of
deficiency is presumptively correct and that burden is on taxpayer to prove otherwise).
259. See Eichbauer v. Commissioner, 30 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 581, 582 (1971)
(stating that taxpayer has burden of establishing that relationship does not violate local law).
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as well as an invasion of privacy, because the courts invoke statutes
criminalizing specific acts and certain sexual relationships to trigger the
exception.' ° The burden of proof normally lies with the accusing party
when alleging the violation of a criminal statute.61 Similarly, the IRS should
bear the burden of proving that a taxpayer's relationship with a person
claimed as the taxpayer's dependent violates state criminal laws prohibiting
certain specific sex acts and sexual relationships before the court denies tax
benefits on the basis of such alleged violations unsupported by criminal
convictions.
The courts' willingness to invoke laws prohibiting specific sex acts to
deny dependency status is also problematic given the statutory language of
Code § 152(b)(5). The local law exception inquires into the "relationship"
between the taxpayer and the domestic partner.2 Although neither Con-
gress nor the Service has attempted to define "relationship" or to explain
how a relationship can violate local law, in common parlance a relationship
encompasses more than just specific acts in which a couple may engage.2 3
Furthermore, no logical reason exists for inquiring only into acts that consti-
tute sex crimes rather than inquiring into other activities in which the couple
engages that may violate other criminal statutes.' The courts provide no
260. The courts' expansive reading of the local law exception in Code § 152(b)(5) raises
invasion of privacy concerns. However, a thorough analysis of these privacy issues is beyond
the scope of this Note.
261. SeeWAYNER.LAFAvE&AusTINW. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINALLAw 48 (2d ed. 1986)
(noting that fundamental American principle places burden of persuasion on prosecutor in
criminal cases to prove defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of grave conse-
quences that result from criminal conviction).
262. See I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (1994) (denying dependency status to individuals if "rela-
tionship between such individual and the taxpayer is in violation of local law" during taxable
year (emphasis added)).
263. See WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNmRiDGED 1916 (1993) (defining "relationship" as "state of affairs existing between
those having relations or dealings"). This definition contemplates that a relationship encom-
passes more than whether or not a couple engages in sexual acts.
264. Behavior governed by state law includes a wide range of activity that does not
necessarily involve relationships even tangentially. For example, a couple might engage in
drug dealing together during the taxable year in question. However, the fact that the couple
engages in one or more criminal acts together does not cause the criminal provision at issue
to govern "relationships." Furthermore, a couple may maintain a relationship that violates
criminal conspiracy statutes. These statutes would seem to be at least as relevant as lewd
cohabitation and criminal sex act statutes to the local law analysis because these statutes speak
directly to ongoing dealings between individuals. See LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 261, at
525 (noting that definition of "conspiracy" requires "an agreement between two or more
persons"). However, the legislative history of Code § 152(b)(5), by implication, reveals that
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justification for looking to one set of criminal statutes in analyzing relation-
ships as opposed to looking to others.
Furthermore, by opening up the local law exception beyond laws
governing domestic relations, the courts open the exception to take account
of local laws that may appear to contradict the policies underlying particular
criminal sex statutes that the courts have invoked.26 For example, several
jurisdictions have enacted gay civil rights legislation that affirmatively
recognizes gay and lesbian relationships.' Municipal domestic partnership
registration programs also serve as evidence that domestic partner relation-
ships do not violate state laws or state policies regarding relationships.6 7
Congress did not intend for the local law analysis to reach criminal conspiracy statutes. See
supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of Code
§ 152(b)(5)).
265. See Barrios, supra note 1, at 857 n.72 (citing Minnesota as example of state that
has sodomy and gay civil rights law in effect simultaneously). The sodomy law reflects a
state policy that would justify excluding same-sex domestic partners from dependency status,
whereas the gay civil rights law reflects a policy that the state intends to protect same-sex
couples from discriminatory treatment and would justify granting dependency status to a
domestic partner. Id.
266. Eight states have enacted civil rights legislation that forbids discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 18500 (West 1995); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 33051 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. INS. CODE § 10140 (West Supp. 1996);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.4 (West Supp.
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 42D-3, 378-2
(Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 18 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); id. ch. 151B,
§ 4 (West 1996); id. ch. 272, § 98 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.02-.03 (West
1990 & Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:2-1, :5-4; :5-33 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 1211, 1302 (Supp. 1995); id. tit. 9, §§ 2362, 2410, 2488, 4502,
4503 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.765 (West 1986); id. §§ 66.39, 66.395, 66.43, 66.405
(West 1990 & Supp. 1995); id. § 101.22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); id. § 118.13 (West 1991
& Supp. 1995); id. § 227.10 (West 1994); id. § 230.01 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); id.
§ 440.77 (West Supp. 1995). The District of Columbia also has enacted gay civil rights
legislation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (Supp. 1995). A number of municipalities have
enacted gay civil rights legislation as well. See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-
Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1905, 1905 & n. 1 (1993) (noting that 139 jurisdictions
had adopted gay civil rights ordinances as of May 1993). A proposal to amend federal law
to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation has been pending in Congress since
1974. LEsBiANS, GAY MEN, supra note 33, at 262 & n.6.
267. See supra note 21 (describing relationship validation function of domestic partner-
ship legislation). But see City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517, 520-22 (Ga. 1995)
(denying Atlanta's authority to extend health insurance coverage to unmarried city employees'
domestic partners because such extension exceeds city's authority under Georgia's Municipal
Home Rule Act and under Georgia Constitution); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d
107, 112-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that Minneapolis exceeded authority granted by
its home rule charter by passing resolution to extend health benefits to city employees' same-
SEX AND TAXES
Realizing that these revisions express a policy of acceptance toward certain
nontraditional relationships by the states and municipalities that have enacted
them is an indispensable part of the local law analysis because this legislation
specifically addresses "relationships." However, adopting a broad interpre-
tation of the local law exception offers no guidance as to which laws should
control in jurisdictions that have laws prohibiting particular sex acts and laws
affirmatively recognizing certain unconventional relationships.
VI. Conclusion
In enacting Code § 152(b)(5), Congress made a judgment that state laws
should govern interpersonal relationships. By neglecting to explain how
relationships could violate local laws, Congress left the statute open to
various interpretations by the Service and the courts. However, the legisla-
tive history reveals only that Congress intended not to disturb the effect of
state laws validating or recognizing specific types of relationships. There-
fore, when applying the local law exception in determining the excludability
of employer-provided domestic partner health benefits, the Service and the
courts should look solely to laws governing marriage and domestic relations
in order to effectuate the plain meaning and legislative intent of the statute.
Provisions examined should include laws granting civil fights to gays and
lesbians, as well as state and municipal domestic partner provisions.2"
Where such laws exist, and the domestic partner meets the support require-
ments of Code § 152(a)(9), the Service should exclude employer-provided
domestic partner health benefits from employees' gross incomes.
In jurisdictions that do not affirmatively recognize nontraditional
relationships, the analysis is more difficult. Although statutes prohibiting
unmarried cohabitation arguably govern relationships, congressional intent
in enacting the local law exception does not appear to have contemplated the
sex domestic partners because resolution contravened state public policy and violated state
law).
268. Although Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979), establishes
that the state is the appropriate jurisdiction to look to in the local law analysis, see id. at 191,
domestic partnership ordinances do not conflict with state statutes governing relationships,
see Bowman & Cornish, supra note 2, at 1202. Therefore, state laws do not preempt the
entire field of domestic relations law, and significant room exists for municipal regulation of
relationships that state law does not preempt. See id. at 1202-03. Domestic partner legisla-
tion fills in the gaps of state domestic relations law and focuses on the needs of local residents
whom state domestic relations law does not protect. See id. at 1202. Therefore, the local
law analysis should take account of municipal domestic partnership legislation, as well as
state law governing domestic relationships.
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application of such statutes to deny dependency status when such application
would result in federal interference in state governance of interpersonal
relationships. Therefore, absent state enforcement of anticohabitation
statutes, the Service should refrain from invoking these statutes to deny
dependency exclusions for domestic partner health benefits. Furthermore,
if the states do enforce anticohabitation statutes regularly, the Service should
not invoke those statutes to deny dependency status absent a state conviction
of the taxpayer or domestic partner, under which the state proved the cou-
ple's violation of the statute by the applicable standard of proof. 9 These
requirements would avoid the unfairness occasioned by requiring taxpayers
to overcome unwarranted presumptions that their relationships involve sexual
relations that render the relationships violative of lewd cohabitation statutes.
Additionally, these requirements would prevent the federal government from
interfering in the states' governance of interpersonal relationships, an area
of law that the states have traditionally regulated.
269. The Service's local law analysis should proceed in the same manner whether
considering cases of same-sex domestic partners or heterosexual domestic partners. The
analysis should not take account of sodomy statutes because such statutes criminalize specific
sexual acts rather than govern relationships per se. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that
the taxpayer's state of residence generally enforces a state statute prohibiting unmarried
cohabitation, the Service should not hold a same-sex relationship violative of the statute
absent a state conviction of one of the relationship's parties. Most state lewd cohabitation
statutes do not encompass same-sex relationships. See 53 C.J.S. Lewdness § 5 (1987) (noting
that lewd cohabitation statutes usually prohibit cohabitation of opposite-sex partners not
married to each other). However, where state lewd cohabitation statutes do exist, the states
are likely to selectively enforce the statutes against same-sex couples only. See Barrios,
supra note 1, at 859 (discussing disparate impact of local law analysis on same-sex couples
and noting that such disparity constitutes additional reason why Service should not include
criminal sex statutes in local law analysis).
350
